OPNFV Copper Project

1. Introduction

Note

This is the working documentation for the Copper project.

The OPNFV Copper project aims to help ensure that virtualized infrastructure and application deployments comply with goals of the NFV service provider or the VNF designer/user.

This is the third (“Danube”) release of the Copper project. The documentation provided here focuses on the overall goals of the Copper project and the specific features supported in the Colorado release.

1.1. Overall Goals for Configuration Policy

As focused on by Copper, configuration policy helps ensure that the NFV service environment meets the requirements of the variety of stakeholders which will provide or use NFV platforms.

These requirements can be expressed as an intent of the stakeholder, in specific terms or more abstractly, but at the highest level they express:

  • what I want
  • what I don’t want

Using road-based transportation as an analogy, some examples of this are shown below:

Configuration Intent Example
Who I Am What I Want What I Don’t Want
user a van, wheelchair-accessible, electric powered someone driving off with my van
road provider keep drivers moving at an optimum safe speed four-way stops
public safety shoulder warning strips, center media barriers speeding, tractors on the freeway

According to their role, service providers may apply more specific configuration requirements than users, since service providers are more likely to be managing specific types of infrastructure capabilities.

Developers and users may also express their requirements more specifically, based upon the type of application or how the user intends to use it.

For users, a high-level intent can be also translated into a more or less specific configuration capability by the service provider, taking into consideration aspects such as the type of application or its constraints.

Examples of such translation are:

Intent Translation into Configuration Capability
Intent Configuration Capability
network security firewall, DPI, private subnets
compute/storage security vulnerability monitoring, resource access controls
high availability clustering, auto-scaling, anti-affinity, live migration
disaster recovery geo-diverse anti-affinity
high compute/storage performance clustering, affinity
high network performance data plane acceleration
resource reclamation low-usage monitoring

Although such intent-to-capability translation is conceptually useful, it is unclear how it can address the variety of aspects that may affect the choice of an applicable configuration capability.

For that reason, the Copper project will initially focus on more specific configuration requirements as fulfilled by specific configuration capabilities, as well as how those requirements and capabilities are expressed in VNF and service design and packaging or as generic policies for the NFV Infrastructure.

2. Release Notes

2.1. Copper Release 1 Scope

OPNFV Brahmaputra was the initial OPNFV release for Copper, and achieved the goals:

  • Add the OpenStack Congress service to OPNFV, through at least one installer project, through post-install configuration.
  • Provide basis tests scripts and tools to exercise the Congress service

2.2. Copper Release 2 Scope

OPNFV Colorado includes the additional features:
  • Congress support in the the OPNFV CI/CD pipeline for the JOID and Apex installers, through the following projects being upstreamed to OpenStack:
    • For JOID, a JuJu Charm for Congress
    • For Apex, a Puppet Module for Congress
  • Congress use case tests integrated into Functest and as manual tests
  • Further enhancements of Congress test tools

2.3. Copper Release 3 Scope

OPNFV Danube includes the additional features:
  • Manual tests
    • Network Bridging test to detect when a VM is connected to 2 networks with different security levels and then pause that VM
  • Further enhancements of Congress test scripts

3. Limitations

The following features have not been verified as of this release:

  • HA deployment: Congress should be installed in OPNFV deployments in a non-HA mode, including in HA deployment scenarios. Basic HA support has been implemented for Congress (see http://docs.openstack.org/developer/congress/index.html), but this feature has not yet been verified on the OPNFV platform.
  • Horizon plugin: The Congress OpenStack Dashboard plugin (a “Policy tab”) has not been deployed in OPNFV as of this release. Installing the needed Congress Dashboard plugin files on the OpenStack Dashboard host is a future work item.

4. Definitions

Definitions
Term Meaning
State Information that can be used to convey or imply the state of something, e.g. an application, resource, entity, etc. This can include data held inside OPNFV components, “events” that have occurred (e.g. “policy violation”), etc.
Event An item of significance to the policy engine, for which the engine has become aware through some method of discovery e.g. polling or notification.

5. Abbreviations

Abbreviations
Term Meaning
CRUD Create, Read, Update, Delete (database operation types)
FCAPS Fault, Configuration, Accounting, Performance, Security
NF Network Function
SFC Service Function Chaining
VNF Virtual Network Function
NFVI Network Function Virtualization Infrastructure

6. Use Cases

6.1. Implemented in Current Release

6.1.1. Network Bridging

As a service provider, I need to prevent tenants from bridging networks I have created with different security levels, e.g. a DMZ network and an Admin network.

An example implementation is shown in the Congress use case test “Network Bridging” (bridging.sh) in the Copper repo under the tests folder. This test:

  • Identifies VMs that are connected to Service Provider (SP) defined networks via floating IPs
  • Identifies VMs that are connected to two such networks with different security levels
  • For VMs that are thus connected, identifies those that are not owned by the Service Provider
  • Reactively enforces the network bridging rule by pausing VMs found to be in violation of the policy

Note the assumptions related to the following example:

  • “SP” is the service provider tenant, and only the SP can create tenants

As implemented through OpenStack Congress:

sp_dmz_connected(x) :-
nova:floating_ips(fixed_ip, id, ip=y, instance_id=x, pool),
neutronv2:floating_ips(id, router_id, tenant_id, floating_network_id=z,
fixed_ip_address, floating_ip_address=y, port_id, status),
neutronv2:networks(id=z, tenant_id=w, name="DMZ", status, admin_state_up, shared),
keystone:tenants(enabled, name="SP", id=w)

sp_admin_connected(x) :-
nova:floating_ips(fixed_ip, id, ip=y, instance_id=x, pool),
neutronv2:floating_ips(id, router_id, tenant_id, floating_network_id=z,
fixed_ip_address, floating_ip_address=y, port_id, status),
neutronv2:networks(id=z, tenant_id=w, name="Admin", status, admin_state_up, shared),
keystone:tenants(enabled, name="SP", id=w)

dmz_admin_connnected(x) :-
sp_dmz_connected(x), sp_admin_connected(x)

dmz_admin_bridging_error(id) :-
nova:servers(id,name,hostId,status,tenant_id=x,user_id,image,flavor,az,hh),
not keystone:tenants(enabled, name="SP", id=x)

execute[nova:servers.pause(id)] :-
dmz_admin_bridging_error(id),
nova:servers(id,status='ACTIVE')

6.1.2. DMZ Deployment

As a service provider, I need to ensure that applications which have not been designed for exposure in a DMZ zone are not attached to DMZ networks.

An example implementation is shown in the Congress use case test “DMZ Placement” (dmz.sh) in the Copper repo under the tests folder. This test:

  • Identifies VMs connected to a DMZ (currently identified through a specifically-named security group)
  • Identifies VMs connected to a DMZ, which are by policy not allowed to be (currently implemented through an image tag intended to identify images that are “authorized” i.e. tested and secure, to be DMZ-connected)
  • Reactively enforces the dmz placement rule by pausing VMs found to be in violation of the policy.

As implemented through OpenStack Congress:

dmz_server(x) :-
nova:servers(id=x,status='ACTIVE'),
neutronv2:ports(id, device_id, status='ACTIVE'),
neutronv2:security_group_port_bindings(id, sg),
neutronv2:security_groups(sg,name='dmz')"

dmz_placement_error(id) :-
nova:servers(id,name,hostId,status,tenant_id,user_id,image,flavor,az,hh),
not glancev2:tags(image,'dmz'),
dmz_server(id)"

execute[nova:servers.pause(id)] :-
dmz_placement_error(id),
nova:servers(id,status='ACTIVE')"

6.1.3. Configuration Auditing

As a service provider or tenant, I need to periodically verify that resource configuration requirements have not been violated, as a backup means to proactive or reactive policy enforcement.

An example implementation is shown in the Congress use case test “SMTP Ingress” (smtp_ingress.sh) in the Copper repo under the tests folder. This test:

  • Detects that a VM is associated with a security group that allows SMTP ingress (TCP port 25)
  • Adds a policy table row entry for the VM, which can be later investigated for appropriate use of the security group

As implemented through OpenStack Congress:

smtp_ingress(x) :-
nova:servers(id=x,status='ACTIVE'),
neutronv2:ports(port_id, status='ACTIVE'),
neutronv2:security_groups(sg, tenant_id, sgn, sgd),
neutronv2:security_group_port_bindings(port_id, sg),
neutronv2:security_group_rules(sg, rule_id, tenant_id, remote_group_id,
 'ingress', ethertype, 'tcp', port_range_min, port_range_max, remote_ip),
lt(port_range_min, 26),
gt(port_range_max, 24)

6.1.4. Reserved Resources

As an NFV Infrastructure provider, I need to ensure that my admins do not inadvertently enable VMs to connect to reserved subnets.

An example implementation is shown in the Congress use case test “Reserved Subnet” (reserved_subnet.sh) in the Copper repo under the tests folder. This test:

  • Detects that a subnet has been created in a reserved range
  • Reactively deletes the subnet

As implemented through OpenStack Congress:

reserved_subnet_error(x) :-
neutronv2:subnets(id=x, cidr='10.7.1.0/24')

execute[neutronv2:delete_subnet(x)] :-
reserved_subnet_error(x)

6.2. For Further Analysis and Implementation

6.2.1. Affinity

Ensures that the VM instance is launched “with affinity to” specific resources, e.g. within a compute or storage cluster. Examples include: “Same Host Filter”, i.e. place on the same compute node as a given set of instances, e.g. as defined in a scheduler hint list.

As implemented by OpenStack Heat using server groups:

Note: untested example...

resources:
  servgrp1:
  type: OS::Nova::ServerGroup
  properties:
    policies:
    - affinity
    serv1:
    type: OS::Nova::Server
    properties:
      image: { get_param: image }
      flavor: { get_param: flavor }
      networks:
        - network: {get_param: network}
    serv2:
    type: OS::Nova::Server
    properties:
      image: { get_param: image }
      flavor: { get_param: flavor }
      networks:
        - network: {get_param: network}

6.2.2. Anti-Affinity

Ensures that the VM instance is launched “with anti-affinity to” specific resources, e.g. outside a compute or storage cluster, or geographic location. Examples include: “Different Host Filter”, i.e. ensures that the VM instance is launched on a different compute node from a given set of instances, as defined in a scheduler hint list.

As implemented by OpenStack Heat using scheduler hints:

Note: untested example...

heat template version: 2013-05-23
parameters:
  image:
  type: string
  default: TestVM
  flavor:
  type: string
  default: m1.micro
  network:
  type: string
  default: cirros_net2
resources:
  serv1:
  type: OS::Nova::Server
  properties:
    image: { get_param: image }
    flavor: { get_param: flavor }
    networks:
      - network: {get_param: network}
    scheduler_hints: {different_host: {get_resource: serv2}}
  serv2:
  type: OS::Nova::Server
  properties:
    image: { get_param: image }
    flavor: { get_param: flavor }
    networks:
      - network: {get_param: network}
    scheduler_hints: {different_host: {get_resource: serv1}}

6.2.3. Network Access Control

Networks connected to VMs must be public or owned by someone in the VM owner’s group.

This use case captures the intent of the following sub-use-cases:

  • Link Mirroring: As a troubleshooter, I need to mirror traffic from physical or virtual network ports so that I can investigate trouble reports.
  • Link Mirroring: As a NFVaaS tenant, I need to be able to mirror traffic on my virtual network ports so that I can investigate trouble reports.
  • Unauthorized Link Mirroring Prevention: As a NFVaaS tenant, I need to be able to prevent other tenants from mirroring traffic on my virtual network ports so that I can protect the privacy of my service users.
  • Link Mirroring Delegation: As a NFVaaS tenant, I need to be able to allow my NFVaaS SP customer support to mirror traffic on my virtual network ports so that they can assist in investigating trouble reports.

As implemented through OpenStack Congress:

Note: untested example...

error :-
nova:vm(vm),
neutron:network(network),
nova:network(vm, network),
neutron:private(network),
nova:owner(vm, vm-own),
neutron:owner(network, net-own),
-same-group(vm-own, net-own)

same-group(user1, user2) :-
ldap:group(user1, g),
ldap:group(user2, g)

6.2.4. Storage Access Control

Storage resources connected to VMs must be owned by someone in the VM owner’s group.

As implemented through OpenStack Congress:

Note: untested example...

error :-
nova:vm(vm),
cinder:volumes(volume),
nova:volume(vm, volume),
nova:owner(vm, vm-own),
neutron:owner(volume, vol-own),
-same-group(vm-own, vol-own)

same-group(user1, user2) :-
ldap:group(user1, g),
ldap:group(user2, g)

6.2.5. Resource Reclamation

As a service provider or tenant, I need to be informed of VMs that are under-utilized so that I can reclaim the VI resources. (example from RuleYourCloud blog)

As implemented through OpenStack Congress:

Note: untested example...

reclaim_server(vm) :-
ceilometer:stats("cpu_util",vm, avg_cpu),
lessthan(avg_cpu, 1)

error(user_id, email, vm_name) :-
reclaim_server(vm),
nova:servers(vm, vm_name, user_id),
keystone:users(user_id, email)

6.2.6. Resource Use Limits

As a tenant or service provider, I need to be automatically terminate an instance that has run for a pre-agreed maximum duration.

As implemented through OpenStack Congress:

Note: untested example...

terminate_server(vm) :-
ceilometer:statistics("duration",vm, avg_cpu),
lessthan(avg_cpu, 1)

error(user_id, email, vm_name) :-
reclaim_server(vm),
nova:servers(vm, vm_name, user_id),
keystone:users(user_id, email)

7. Architecture

7.1. Architectural Concept

The following example diagram illustrates a “relationship diagram” type view of an NFVI platform, in which the roles of components focused on policy management, services, and infrastructure are shown.

This view illustrates that a large-scale deployment of NFVI may leverage multiple components of the same “type” (e.g. SDN Controller), which fulfill specific purposes for which they are optimized. For example, a global SDN controller and cloud orchestrator can act as directed by a service orchestrator in the provisioning of VNFs per intent, while various components at a local and global level handle policy-related events directly and/or feed them back through a closed-loop policy design that responds as needed, directly or through the service orchestrator.

policy_architecture.png

(source of the diagram above: https://git.opnfv.org/cgit/copper/plain/design_docs/images/policy_architecture.pptx)

7.2. Architectural Aspects

  • Policies are reflected in two high-level goals
    • Ensure resource requirements of VNFs and services are applied per VNF designer, service, and tenant intent
    • Ensure that generic policies are not violated, e.g. networks connected to VMs must either be public or owned by the VM owner
  • Policies are distributed through two main means
    • As part of VNF packages, customized if needed by Service Design tools, expressing intent of the VNF designer and service provider, and possibly customized or supplemented by service orchestrators per the intent of specific tenants
    • As generic policies provisioned into VIMs (SDN controllers and cloud orchestrators), expressing intent of the service provider re what states/events need to be policy-governed independently of specific VNFs
  • Policies are applied locally and in closed-loop systems per the capabilities of the local policy enforcer and the impact of the related state/event conditions
    • VIMs should be able to execute most policies locally
    • VIMs may need to pass policy-related state/events to a closed-loop system, where those events are relevant to other components in the architecture (e.g. service orchestrator), or some additional data/arbitration is needed to resolve the state/event condition
  • Policies are localized as they are distributed/delegated
    • High-level policies (e.g. expressing “intent”) can be translated into VNF package elements or generic policies, perhaps using distinct syntaxes
    • Delegated policy syntaxes are likely VIM-specific, e.g. Datalog (Congress)
  • Closed-loop policy and VNF-lifecycle event handling are //somewhat// distinct
    • Closed-loop policy is mostly about resolving conditions that can’t be handled locally, but as above in some cases the conditions may be of relevance and either delivered directly or forwarded to service orchestrators
    • VNF-lifecycle events that can’t be handled by the VIM locally are delivered directly to the service orchestrator
  • Some events/analytics need to be collected into a more “open-loop” system which can enable other actions, e.g.
    • audits and manual interventions
    • machine-learning focused optimizations of policies (largely a future objective)

Issues to be investigated as part of establishing an overall cohesive/adaptive policy architecture:

  • For the various components which may fulfill a specific purpose, what capabilities (e.g. APIs) do they have/need to
    • handle events locally
    • enable closed-loop policy handling components to subscribe/optimize policy-related events that are of interest
  • For global controllers and cloud orchestrators
    • How do they support correlation of events impacting resources in different scopes (network and cloud)
    • What event/response flows apply to various policy use cases
  • What specific policy use cases can/should fall into each overall class
    • locally handled by NFVI components
    • handled by a closed-loop policy system, either VNF/service-specific or VNF-independent

8. Requirements

This section outlines general requirements for configuration policies, per the two main aspects in the Copper project scope:

  • Ensuring resource requirements of VNFs and services are applied per VNF designer, service, and tenant intent
  • Ensuring that generic policies are not violated, e.g. networks connected to VMs must either be public or owned by the VM owner

8.1. Resource Requirements

Resource requirements describe the characteristics of virtual resources (compute, storage, network) that are needed for VNFs and services, and how those resources should be managed over the lifecycle of a VNF/service. Upstream projects already include multiple ways in which resource requirements can be expressed and fulfilled, e.g.:

  • OpenStack Nova
    • the Image feature, enabling “VM templates” to be defined for NFs and referenced by name as a specific NF version to be used
    • the Flavor feature, addressing basic compute and storage requirements, with extensibility for custom attributes
  • OpenStack Heat
    • the Heat Orchestration Template feature, enabling a variety of VM aspects to be defined and managed by Heat throughout the VM lifecycle, notably
      • alarm handling (requires Ceilometer)
      • attached volumes (requires Cinder)
      • domain name assignment (requires Designate)
      • images (requires Glance)
      • autoscaling
      • software configuration associated with VM lifecycle hooks (CREATE, UPDATE, SUSPEND, RESUME, DELETE)
      • wait conditions and signaling for sequencing orchestration steps
      • orchestration service user management (requires Keystone)
      • shared storage (requires Manila)
      • load balancing (requires Neutron LBaaS)
      • firewalls (requires Neutron FWaaS)
      • various Neutron-based network and security configuration items
      • Nova flavors
      • Nova server attributes including access control
      • Nova server group affinity and anti-affinity
      • “Data-intensive application clustering” (requires Sahara)
      • DBaaS (requires Trove)
      • “multi-tenant cloud messaging and notification service” (requires Zaqar)
  • OpenStack Group-Based Policy
    • API-based grouping of endpoints with associated contractual expectations for data flow processing and service chaining
  • OpenStack Tacker
    • “a fully functional ETSI MANO based general purpose NFV Orchestrator and VNF Manager for OpenStack”
  • OpenDaylight Group-Based Policy
    • model-based grouping of endpoints with associated contractual expectations for data flow processing
  • OpenDaylight Service Function Chaining (SFC)
    • model-based management of “service chains” and the infrastucture that enables them
  • Additional projects that are commonly used for configuration management, implemented as client-server frameworks using model-based, declarative, or scripted configuration management data.

8.2. Generic Policy Requirements

Generic policy requirements address conditions related to resource state and events which need to be monitored for, and optionally responded to or prevented. These conditions are typically expected to be VNF/service-independent, as VNF/service-dependent condition handling (e.g. scale in/out) are considered to be addressed by VNFM/NFVO/VIM functions as described under Resource Requirements or as FCAPS related functions. However the general capabilities below can be applied to VNF/service-specific policy handling as well, or in particular to invocation of VNF/service-specific management/orchestration actions. The high-level required capabilities include:

  • Polled monitoring: Exposure of state via request-response APIs.
  • Notifications: Exposure of state via pub-sub APIs.
  • Realtime/near-realtime notifications: Notifications that occur in actual or near realtime.
  • Delegated policy: CRUD operations on policies that are distributed to specific components for local handling, including one/more of monitoring, violation reporting, and enforcement.
  • Violation reporting: Reporting of conditions that represent a policy violation.
  • Reactive enforcement: Enforcement actions taken in response to policy violation events.
  • Proactive enforcement: Enforcement actions taken in advance of policy violation events, e.g. blocking actions that could result in a policy violation.
  • Compliance auditing: Periodic auditing of state against policies.

Upstream projects already include multiple ways in which configuration conditions can be monitored and responded to:

  • OpenStack Congress provides a table-based mechanism for state monitoring and proactive/reactive policy enforcement, including data obtained from internal databases of OpenStack core and optional services. The Congress design approach is also extensible to other VIMs (e.g. SDNCs) through development of data source drivers for the new monitored state information.
  • OpenStack Aodh provides means to trigger alarms upon a wide variety of conditions derived from its monitored OpenStack analytics.
  • Nagios “offers complete monitoring and alerting for servers, switches, applications, and services”.

8.3. Requirements Validation Approach

The Copper project will assess the completeness of the upstream project solutions for requirements in scope though a process of:

  • developing configuration policy use cases to focus solution assessment tests
  • integrating the projects into the OPNFV platform for testing
  • executing functional and performance tests for the solutions
  • assessing overall requirements coverage and gaps in the most complete upstream solutions

Depending upon the priority of discovered gaps, new requirements will be submitted to upstream projects for the next available release cycle.

9. Copper Configuration

This release includes installer support for the OpenStack Congress service under JOID and Apex installers. Congress is installed by default for all JOID and Apex scenarios. Support for other OPNFV installer deployed environments is planned for the next release.

9.1. Pre-configuration Activities

None required.

9.2. Hardware Configuration

There is no specific hardware configuration required for the Copper project.

9.3. Feature Configuration

9.3.1. OPNFV Installer Support

The Congress service is automatically configured as required by the JOID and Apex installers, including creation of datasources per the installed datasource drivers. This release includes default support for the following datasource drivers:

  • nova
  • neutronv2
  • ceilometer
  • cinder
  • glancev2
  • keystone

For JOID, Congress is installed through a JuJu Charm, and for Apex through a Puppet Module. Both the Charm and Module are being upstreamed to OpenStack for future maintenance.

Other project installer support (e.g. Doctor) may install additional datasource drivers once Congress is installed.

9.3.2. Manual Installation

NOTE: This section describes a manual install procedure that had been tested under the JOID and Apex base installs prior to the integration of native installer support through JuJu (JOID) and Puppet (Apex). This procedure is being maintained as a basis for additional installer support in future releases. However, since Congress is pre-installed for JOID and Apex, this procedure is not necessary and not recommended for use if Congress is already installed.

Copper provides a set of bash scripts to automatically install Congress based upon a JOID or Apex install which does not already have Congress installed. These scripts are in the Copper repo at:

  • components/congress/install/bash/install_congress_1.sh
  • components/congress/install/bash/install_congress_2.sh

Prerequisites to using these scripts:

  • OPFNV installed via JOID or Apex
  • For Apex installs, on the jumphost, ssh to the undercloud VM and “su stack”.
  • For JOID installs, admin-openrc.sh saved from Horizon to ~/admin-openrc.sh
  • Retrieve the copper install script as below, optionally specifying the branch to use as a URL parameter, e.g. ?h=stable%2Fbrahmaputra

To invoke the procedure, enter the following shell commands, optionally specifying the branch identifier to use for OpenStack.

cd ~
wget https://git.opnfv.org/cgit/copper/plain/components/congress/install/bash/install_congress_1.sh
wget https://git.opnfv.org/cgit/copper/plain/components/congress/install/bash/install_congress_2.sh
bash install_congress_1.sh [openstack-branch]

9.4. Copper Post Configuration Procedures

No configuration procedures are required beyond the basic install procedure.

10. Copper Post Installation Procedures

This section describes optional procedures for verifying that the Congress service is operational as well as additional test tools developed for the Colorado release.

10.1. Copper Functional Tests

This release includes the following test cases which are integrated into OPNFV Functest for the JOID and Apex installers:

  • DMZ Placement: dmz.sh
  • SMTP Ingress: smtp_ingress.sh
  • Reserved Subnet: reserved_subnet.sh

These scripts, related scripts that clean up the OpenStack environment afterward, and a combined test runner (run.sh) are in the Copper repo under the “tests” folder. Instructions for using the tests are provided as script comments.

Further description of the tests is provided on the Copper wiki at https://wiki.opnfv.org/display/copper/testing.

10.2. Congress Test Webapp

This release also provides a webapp that can be automatically installed in a Docker container on the OPNFV jumphost. This script is in the Copper repo at:

  • components/congress/test-webapp/setup/install_congress_testserver.sh

Prerequisites for using this script:

  • OPFNV installed per JOID or Apex installer
  • For Apex installs, on the jumphost, ssh to the undercloud VM and “su stack”

To invoke the procedure, enter the following shell commands, optionally specifying the branch identifier to use for Copper:

wget https://git.opnfv.org/cgit/copper/plain/components/congress/test-webapp/setup/install_congress_testserver.sh
bash install_congress_testserver.sh [copper-branch]

10.2.1. Using the Test Webapp

Browse to the webapp IP address provided at the end of the install procedure.

Interactive options are meant to be self-explanatory given a basic familiarity with the Congress service and data model.

10.2.2. Removing the Test Webapp

The webapp can be removed by running this script from the Copper repo:

  • components/congress/test-webapp/setup/clean_congress_testserver.sh

11. Copper Capabilities and Usage

This release focuses on use of the OpenStack Congress service for managing configuration policy. See the Congress intro guide for general information on the capabilities and usage of Congress.

Examples of Congress API usage can be found in the Copper tests as described on the OPNFV wiki at https://wiki.opnfv.org/display/copper/testing.