Anuket OpenStack based Reference Architecture

Anuket

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1 Introduction

1.1 Overview

This Reference Architecture is focussed on OpenStack as the Virtualised Infrastructure Manager (VIM) chosen based on the criteria laid out in the Introduction. OpenStack has the advantage of being a mature and widely accepted open-source technology; a strong ecosystem of vendors that support it, the OpenInfra Foundation for managing the community, and, most importantly, it is widely deployed by the global operator community for both internal infrastructure and external facing products and services. This means that the operators have existing staff with the right skill sets to support a Cloud Infrastructure (NFVI) deployment into development, test and production. Another reason to choose OpenStack is that it has a large active community of vendors and operators, which means that any code or component changes needed to support the Common Telco Cloud Infrastructure requirements can be managed through the existing project communities' processes to add and validate the required features through well-established mechanisms.

Vision

The OpenStack-based Anuket Reference Architecture will host NFV workloads, primarily VNFs, of interest to the Anuket community. The Reference Architecture document can be used by operators to deploy Anuket conformant infrastructure; hereafter, "conformant" denotes that the resource can satisfy tests conducted to verify conformance with this reference architecture.

1.2 Use Cases

Several NFV use cases are documented in OpenStack. For more examples and details refer to the OpenStack docs. Examples include:

- **Overlay networks**: The overlay functionality design includes OpenStack Networking in Open vSwitch GRE tunnel mode. In this case, the layer-3 external routers pair with VRRP, and switches pair with an implementation of MLAG to ensure that you do not lose connectivity with the upstream routing infrastructure.
- **Performance tuning**: Network level tuning for this workload is minimal. Quality of Service (QoS) applies to these workloads for a middle ground Class Selector depending on existing policies. It is higher than a best effort queue but lower than an Expedited Forwarding or Assured Forwarding queue. Since this type of application generates larger packets with longer-lived connections, you can optimize bandwidth utilization for long duration TCP. Normal bandwidth planning applies here with regards to benchmarking a session's usage multiplied by the expected number of concurrent sessions with overhead.
- Network functions: Network functions is a broad category but encompasses workloads that support the exchange of information (data, voice, multi-media) over a system's network. Some of these workloads tend to consist of a large number of small-sized packets that are short lived, such as DNS queries or SNMP traps. These messages need to arrive quickly and, thus, do not handle packet loss. Network function workloads have requirements that may affect configurations including at the hypervisor level. For an application that generates 10 TCP sessions per user with an average bandwidth of 512 kilobytes per second per flow and expected user count of ten thousand (10,000) concurrent users, the expected bandwidth plan is approximately 4.88 gigabits per second. The supporting network for this type of configuration needs to have a low latency and evenly distributed load across the topology. These types of workload benefit from having services local to the consumers of the service. Thus, use a multi-site approach, as well as, deploying many copies of the application to handle load as close as possible to consumers. Since these applications function independently, they do not warrant running overlays to interconnect tenant networks. Overlays also have the drawback of performing poorly with rapid flow setup and may incur too much overhead with large quantities of small packets and therefore we do not recommend them. QoS is desirable for some workloads to ensure delivery. DNS has a major impact on the load times of other services and needs to be reliable and provide rapid responses. Configure rules in upstream devices to apply a higher-Class Selector to DNS to ensure faster delivery or a better spot in queuing algorithms.

1.3 Anuket OpenStack Reference Release

This Reference Architecture document conforms to the OpenStack Wallaby release. While many features and capabilities are conformant with many OpenStack releases, this document will refer to features, capabilities and APIs that are part of the OpenStack Wallaby release. For ease, this Anuket Reference Architecture document version can be referred to as "RA-1 OSTK Wallaby."

1.4 Principles

OpenStack Reference Architecture must obey to the following set of principles:

- Anuket General Principles
- Architectural Principles

OpenStack specific principles

OpenStack considers the following Four Opens essential for success:

- · Open Source
- Open Design
- · Open Development
- · Open Community

This OpenStack Reference Architecture is organised around the three major Cloud Infrastructure resource types as core services of compute, storage and networking, and a set of shared services of identity management, image management, graphical user interface, orchestration engine, etc.

1.5 Document Organisation

Chapter 2 defines the Reference Architecture requirements and, when appropriate, provides references to where these requirements are addressed in this document. The intent of this document is to address all of the mandatory ("must") requirements and the most useful of the other optional ("should") requirements. Chapter 3 and 4 cover the Cloud Infrastructure resources and the core OpenStack services, while the APIs are covered in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 covers the implementation and enforcement of security capabilities and controls. Life Cycle Management of the Cloud Infrastructure and VIM are covered in Chapter 7 with stress on Logging, Monitoring and Analytics (LMA), configuration management and some other operational items. Please note that Chapter 7 is not a replacement for the implementation, configuration and operational documentation that accompanies the different OpenStack distributions. Chapter 8 identifies certain Gaps that currently exist and plans on how to address them. For example, Service Function Chaining support needs to be addressed to realise the full potential and value of SDN and NFV.

1.6 Terminology

General terminology definitions can be found in Glossary and specific terms relating to this reference architecture are to be found in *OpenStack Related Terminology : ref: `common/glossary:openstack related terminology*.

2 Architecture Requirements

2.1 Introduction

must: Requirements that are marked as *must* are considered mandatory and must exist in the reference architecture and reflected in any implementation targeting this reference architecture. The same applies to *must not*.

should: Requirements that are marked as *should* are expected to be fulfilled by the reference architecture but it is up to each service provider to accept an implementation targeting this reference architecture that is not reflecting on any of those requirements. The same applies to *should not*. > RFC2119

may: Requirements that are marked as may are considered optional. The same applies to may not.

This chapter includes both "Requirements" that must be satisifed in an RA-1 conformant implementation and "Recommendations" that are optional for implementation.

2.2 Reference Model Requirements

The tables below contain the requirements from the Reference Model to cover the Basic and High-Performance profiles.

To ensure alignment with the infrastructure profile catalogue, the following requirements are referenced through:

- Those relating to Cloud Infrastructure Software Profiles
- Those relating to Cloud Infrastructure Hardware Profiles
- Those relating to Cloud Infrastructure Management
- Those relating to Cloud Infrastructure Security

Cloud Infrastructure Software Profile Requirements for Compute

(source Cloud Infrastructure Software Profiles features and requirements)

Table 2.1: Reference Model Requirements:	Cloud Infrastructure Soft-
ware Profile Capabilities	

Reference	Description	Require- ment for Basic Profile	Require- ment for High- Performanc Profile	
e.cap.001	Max number of vCPU that can be assigned to a single instance by the Cloud In- frastructure	At least 16	At least 16	Compute Nodes
e.cap.002	Max memory that can be assigned to a single in- stance by the Cloud Infras- tructure	at least 32 GB	at least 32 GB	Virtual Storage
e.cap.003	Max storage that can be assigned to a single in- stance by the Cloud Infras- tructure	at least 320 GB	at least 320 GB	Virtual Storage and Stor- age Backend
e.cap.004	Max number of connec- tion points that can be as- signed to a single instance by the Cloud Infrastruc- ture	6	6	Not Detailed
e.cap.005	Max storage that can be at- tached / mounted to an in- stance by the Cloud Infras- tructure	Up to 16TB:sup: <i>1</i>	Up to 16TB:sup: <i>1</i>	Storage Backend
e.cap.006/infra.com.cfg.003	CPU pinning support	Not re- quired	Must support	Consumable Infras- tructure Resources and Services
e.cap.007/infra.com.cfg.002	NUMA support	Not re- quired	Must support	Consumable Infras- tructure Resources and Services
e.cap.018/infra.com.cfg.005	Simultaneous Multi- threading (SMT) enabled	Must	Optional support	Consumable Infras- tructure Resources and Services
i.cap.018/infra.com.cfg.004	Huge pages configured	Not re- quired	Must support	Consumable Infras- tructure Resources and Services

:sup:`1` Defined in the .bronze configuration in Storage Extensions

Cloud Infrastructure Software Profile Extensions Requirements for Compute

Reference	Description	Profile Ex-	Profile	Specification Reference
		tensions	Extra-	
			Specs	
e.cap.008/infra.com.acc.cfg	.0IPISec Acceleration using	Compute		Acceleration
	the virtio-ipsec interface	Intensive		
		GPU		
e.cap.010/infra.com.acc.cfg	.002 anscoding Acceleration	Compute	Video	Acceleration
		Intensive	Transcod-	
		GPU	ing	
e.cap.011/infra.com.acc.cfg	.098 ogrammable Accelera-	Firmware-	Accelera-	Acceleration
	tion	programmab	letor	
		adapter		
e.cap.012	Enhanced Cache Manage-	Е	Е	Not detailed
	ment: L=Lean; E=Equal;			
	X=eXpanded			
e.cap.014/infra.com.acc.cfg	.0H4ardware coprocessor	Compute		Acceleration
	support (GPU/NPU)	Intensive		
		GPU		
e.cap.016/infra.com.acc.cfg	.000 GA/other Acceleration	Firmware-		Acceleration
	H/W	programmab	le	
		adapter		

 Table 2.2: Cloud Infrastructure Software Profile Extensions Requirements for Compute

Cloud Infrastructure Software Profile Requirements for Networking

(source Virtual Networking)

The features and configuration requirements related to virtual networking for the two (2) types of Cloud Infrastructure Profiles are specified below followed by networking bandwidth requirements.

Deferrence	Description	Decuire	Deguire	Creat
Reference	Description	Require-	Require-	Speci-
		ment for	ment	fication
		Basic	for High-	Reference
		Profile	Performanc	е
			Profile	
infra.net.cfg.001	IO virtualisation using virtio1.1	Must	Must	Virtualisa-
		support	support	tion
infra.net.cfg.002	The overlay network encapsulation proto-	Must	No require-	Network
	col needs to enable ECMP in the underlay	support	ment speci-	Fabric
	to take advantage of the scale-out features	VXLAN,	fied	
	of the network fabric	MPLSoUDP,		
		GENEVE,		
		other		
infra.net.cfg.003	Network Address Translation	Must	Must	Network
		support	support	Fabric
infra.net.cfg.004	Security Groups	Must	Must	Workload
		support	support	Security
infra.net.cfg.005	SFC support	Not re-	Must	Not de-
		quired	support	tailed
infra.net.cfg.006	Traffic patterns symmetry	Must	Must	Not de-
-		support	support	tailed

 Table 2.3: Reference Model Requirements - Virtual Networking

The required number of connection points to an instance is described in e.cap.004 *above*. The table below specifies the required bandwidth of those connection points.

Table 2.4: Reference Model Requirements - Network Interface Spe	ecifi-
cations	

Reference	Description	Require-	Require-	Specification Reference
		ment for	ment for	
		Basic	High Per-	
		Profile	formance	
			Profile	
n1, n2, n3, n4, n5, n6	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Gbps	Must	Must	Not detailed
		support	support	
n10, n20, n30, n40, n50,	10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60 Gbps	Must	Must	Not detailed
n60		support	support	
n25, n50, n75, n100, n125,	25, 50, 75, 100, 125, 150	Optional	Must	Not detailed
n150	Gbps		support	
n50, n100, n150, n200,	50, 100, 150, 200, 250,	Optional	Must	Not detailed
n250, n300	300 Gbps		support	
n100, n200, n300, n400,	100, 200, 300, 400, 500,	Optional	Must	Not detailed
n500, n600	600 Gbps		support	

Cloud Infrastructure Software Profile Extensions Requirements for Networking

Reference	Description	Require- ment for Basic Profile	Require- ment for High- Performanc Profile	Specification Reference
e.cap.013/infra.hw.nac.cfg.0	08R-IOV over PCI-PT	N	Y	Compute Nodes
e.cap.019/infra.net.acc.cfg.0	OtSwitch optimisation	N	Y	Compute Nodes and Net-
	(DPDK)			work quality of service
e.cap.015/infra.net.acc.cfg.0	082martNIC (for HW Of-	N	Optional	Acceleration
	fload)			
e.cap.009/infra.net.acc.cfg.0	0 C rypto acceleration	N	Optional	Not detailed
infra.net.acc.cfg.004	Crypto Acceleration Inter-	N	Optional	Not detailed
	face			

 Table 2.5: Cloud Infrastructure Software Profile Extensions Requirements for Networking

Cloud Infrastructure Software Profile Requirements for Storage

(source Cloud Infrastructure Software Profiles features and requirements)

Reference	Description	Require-	Require-	Specification Reference		
		ment for	ment			
		Basic	for High-			
		Profile	Performanc	e		
			Profile			
infra.stg.cfg.002	Storage Block	Must	Must	Storage and Cinder		
		support	support			
infra.stg.cfg.003	Storage with replication	Not re-	Must	Storage and Transaction		
		quired	support	Volume Considerations		
infra.stg.cfg.004	Storage with encryption	Must	Must	Storage		
		support	support			
infra.stg.acc.cfg.001	Storage IOPS oriented	Not re-	Must	Storage		
		quired	support			
infra.stg.acc.cfg.002	Storage capacity oriented	Not re-	Not re-	Storage		
		quired	quired			

 Table 2.6: Reference Model Requirements - Cloud Infrastructure Software Profile Requirements for Storage

Cloud Infrastructure Software Profile Extensions Requirements for Storage

Table 2.7: Reference Model Requirements - Cloud Infrastructure Software Profile Extensions Requirements for Storage for Networking

		1 0		
Reference	Description	Profile Extensions	Profile	Specification Reference
			Extra-	
			Specs	
in-	Storage IOPS ori-	Storage Intensive High-		
fra.stg.acc.cfg.001	ented	performance storage		
in-	Storage capacity	High Capacity		
fra.stg.acc.cfg.002	oriented			

Cloud Infrastructure Hardware Profile Requirements

(source Cloud Infrastructure Hardware Profiles features and requirements.)

Table 2.8: Reference Model Requirements - Cloud Infrastructure Hard-
ware Profile Requirements

Reference	Description	Require- ment for Basic Profile	Require- ment for High- Performanc Profile	Specification Reference
infra.hw.001	CPU Architecture (Values such as x64, ARM, etc.)			
infra.hw.cpu.cfg.001	Minimum number of CPU (Sockets)	2	2	
infra.hw.cpu.cfg.002	Minimum number of Cores per CPU	20	20	
infra.hw.cpu.cfg.003	NUMA	Not re- quired	Must support	
infra.hw.cpu.cfg.004	Simultaneous Multi- threading/Symmetric Multiprocessing (SMT/SMP)	Must support	Optional	
infra.hw.stg.hdd.cfg.001	Local Storage HDD	No require- ment speci- fied	No require- ment speci- fied	
infra.hw.stg.ssd.cfg.002	Local Storage SSD	Should support	Should support	
infra.hw.nic.cfg.001	TotalNumberofNICPorts available in the host	4	4	
infra.hw.nic.cfg.002	Port speed specified in Gbps (minimum values)	10	25	
infra.hw.pci.cfg.001	Number of PCIe slots available in the host	8	8	
infra.hw.pci.cfg.002	PCIe speed	Gen 3	Gen 3	
infra.hw.pci.cfg.003	PCIe Lanes	8	8	
infra.hw.nac.cfg.003	Compression	No require- ment speci- fied	No require- ment speci- fied	

Cloud Infrastructure Hardware Profile-Extensions Requirements

(source Cloud Infrastructure Hardware Profiles features and requirements.)

wate 1	Tome Extensions Requirement	113		
Reference	Description	Require-	Require-	Specification Reference
		ment for	ment	
		Basic	for High-	
		Profile	Performanc	e
			Profile	
e.cap.014/infra.hw.cac.cfg.0	0 G PU	N	Optional	
e.cap.016/infra.hw.cac.cfg.0	OEPGA/other Acceleration	N	Optional	
	H/W			
e.cap.009/infra.hw.nac.cfg.0	OCrypto Acceleration	N	Optional	
e.cap.015/infra.hw.nac.cfg.0	0 S martNIC	N	Optional	
infra.hw.nac.cfg.003	Compression	Optional	Optional	
e.cap.013/infra.hw.nac.cfg.0	08R-IOV over PCI-PT	N	Yes	

 Table 2.9: Reference Model Requirements - Cloud Infrastructure Hardware Profile Extensions Requirements

Cloud Infrastructure Management Requirements

(source Cloud Infrastructure Management Capabilities)

uge			
Reference	Description	Require-	Specification Reference
		ment	
		(common	
		to all	
		Profiles)	
e.man.001	Capability to allocate virtual compute re-	Must	
	sources to a workload	support	
e.man.002	Capability to allocate virtual storage re-	Must	
	sources to a workload	support	
e.man.003	Capability to allocate virtual networking	Must	
	resources to a workload	support	
e.man.004	Capability to isolate resources between	Must	
	tenants	support	
e.man.005	Capability to manage workload software	Must	
	images	support	
e.man.006	Capability to provide information related	Must	
	to allocated virtualised resources per ten-	support	
	ant		
e.man.007	Capability to notify state changes of allo-	Must	
	cated resources	support	
e.man.008	Capability to collect and expose per-	Must	
	formance information on virtualised re-	support	
	sources allocated		
e.man.009	Capability to collect and notify fault in-	Must	
	formation on virtualised resources	support	

 Table 2.10: Reference Model Requirements - Cloud Infrastructure Management Requirements

Cloud Infrastructure Security Requirements

System Hardening Requirements

(source System Hardening)

	ments		
Reference	sub-category	Description	Specification Reference
sec.gen.001	Hardening	The Platform must maintain the specified	Security LCM
		configuration.	Cloud Infrastructure provision-
			ing and configuration manage-
			ment
sec.gen.002	Hardening	All systems part of Cloud Infrastructure	Password policy
		must support hardening as defined in CIS	
		Password Policy Guide .	
sec.gen.003	Hardening	All servers part of Cloud Infrastructure must	Server boot hardening
C		support a root of trust and secure boot.	C C
sec.gen.004	Hardening	The Operating Systems of all the servers part	Function and Software
e		of Cloud Infrastructure must be hardened	
		by removing or disabling unnecessary ser-	
		vices, applications and network protocols,	
		configuring operating system user authen-	
		tication, configuring resource controls, in-	
		stalling and configuring additional security	
		controls where needed, and testing the secu-	
		rity of the Operating System (NIST SP 800-	
		123).	
sec.gen.005	Hardening	The Platform must support Operating Sys-	System Access
sec.gen.005	Thatdenning	tem level access control.	System Access
	Hordoning		System Access
sec.gen.006	Hardening	The Platform must support Secure logging.	System Access
		Logging with root account must be prohib-	
007		ited when root privileges are not required.	
sec.gen.007	Hardening	All servers part of Cloud Infrastructure must	Security Logs Time Synchroni-
		be Time synchronised with authenticated	sation
		Time service.	
sec.gen.008	Hardening	All servers part of Cloud Infrastructure must	Security LCM
		be regularly updated to address security vul-	
		nerabilities.	
sec.gen.009	Hardening	The Platform must support software in-	Integrity of OpenStack compo-
		tegrity protection and verification.	nents configuration
sec.gen.010	Hardening	The Cloud Infrastructure must support en-	Confidentiality and Integrity
		crypted storage, for example, block, object	
		and file storage, with access to encryption	
		keys restricted based on a need to know	
		(Controlled Access Based on the Need to	
		Know).	
sec.gen.012	Hardening	The Operator must ensure that only autho-	This requirement's verification
		rised actors have physical access to the un-	goes beyond Anuket testing
		derlying infrastructure.	scope
sec.gen.013	Hardening	The Platform must ensure that only autho-	System Access
C		rised actors have logical access to the under-	· ·
		lying infrastructure.	
sec.gen.015	Hardening	Any change to the Platform must be logged	Security LCM
		as a security event, and the logged event	~
		must include the identity of the entity mak-	
		ing the change, the change, the date and the	
		time of the change.	
		une of the change.	

Table 2.11: Reference Model Requirements - System Hardening Requirements

Platform and Access Requirements

(source Platform and Access)

Table 2.12:	Reference Model Requirements - Platform and Access Re-
quirements	

<u> </u>	quirements			
Reference	sub- category	Description	Specification Refere	nce
sec.sys.001	Access	The Platform must support authenticated	RBAC	
		and secure access to API, GUI and com-		
		mand line interfaces		
sec.sys.002	Access	The Platform must support Traffic Filter-	Workload Security	
		ing for workloads (for example, Firewall).		
sec.sys.003	Access	The Platform must support Secure and	Confidentiality	and
		encrypted communications, and confi-	Integrity	
		dentiality and integrity of network		
sec.sys.004	Access	The Cloud Infrastructure must support	Confidentiality	and
-		authentication, integrity and confidential-	Integrity	
		ity on all network channels.		
sec.sys.005	Access	The Cloud Infrastructure must segregate	Confidentiality	and
		the underlay and overlay networks.	Integrity	
sec.sys.006	Access	The Cloud Infrastructure must be able to	Identity Security	
5		utilise the Cloud Infrastructure Manager		
		identity lifecycle management capabili-		
		ties.		
sec.sys.007	Access	The Platform must implement controls	RBAC	
		enforcing separation of duties and priv-		
		ileges, least privilege use and least		
		common mechanism (Role-Based Access		
		Control).		
sec.sys.008	Access	The Platform must be able to assign the	Workload Security	
see.sys.ooo	1100000	Entities that comprise the tenant net-	Workfoud Security	
		works to different trust domains. (Com-		
		munication between different trust do-		
		mains is not allowed, by default.)		
sec.sys.009	Access	The Platform must support creation of		
sec.sys.007	1 100033	Trust Relationships between trust do-		
		mains. These maybe uni-directional rela-		
		tionships where the trusting domain trusts		
		another domain (the "trusted domain")		
		to authenticate users for them them or		
		to allow access to its resources from the		
		trusted domain. In a bidirectional rela-		
		tionship both domain are "trusting" and		
		"trusted".		
sec.sys.010	Access	For two or more domains without existing		
sec.sys.010	Access	trust relationships, the Platform must not		
		allow the effect of an attack on one do-		
		main to impact the other domains either		
		directly or indirectly.		
sec.sys.011	Access	The Platform must not reuse the same au-	System Access	
Sec.5y5.011	Access	thentication credentials (e.g., key pairs)	System Access	
		on different Platform components (e.g.,		
		different hosts, or different services).		
sec.sys.012	Access	The Platform must protect all secrets by		
500.5y5.012	ЛИСТО	using strong encryption techniques and		
		storing the protected secrets externally		
		from the component (e.g., in OpenStack		
600 OV0 012	A 22222	Barbican)		
sec.sys.013	Access	The Platform must generate secrets dy-		
015	A	namically as and when needed.		
sec.sys.015	Access	The Platform must not contain back door		
		entries (unpublished access points, APIs,		

Confidentiality and Integrity Requirements

(source Confidentiality and Integrity)

Reference	sub-category	Description	Specification Reference
sec.ci.001	Confidential-	The Platform must support Confidential-	Confidentiality and
	ity/Integrity	ity and Integrity of data at rest and in tran-	Integrity
		sit.	
sec.ci.003	Confidential-	The Platform must support Confidential-	
	ity/Integrity	ity and Integrity of data related metadata.	
sec.ci.004	Confidentiality	The Platform must support Confidential-	
		ity of processes and restrict information	
		sharing with only the process owner (e.g.,	
		tenant).	
sec.ci.005	Confidential-	The Platform must support Confidential-	
	ity/Integrity	ity and Integrity of process- related meta-	
		data and restrict information sharing with	
		only the process owner (e.g., tenant).	
sec.ci.006	Confidential-	The Platform must support Confidential-	
	ity/Integrity	ity and Integrity of workload resource	
		utilisation (RAM, CPU, Storage, Net-	
		work I/O, cache, hardware offload) and	
		restrict information sharing with only the	
		workload owner (e.g., tenant).	
sec.ci.007	Confidential-	The Platform must not allow Memory In-	
	ity/Integrity	spection by any actor other than the au-	
		thorised actors for the Entity to which	
		Memory is assigned (e.g., tenants own-	
		ing the workload), for Lawful Inspection,	
		and for secure monitoring services. Ad-	
		ministrative access must be managed us-	
		ing Platform Identity Lifecycle Manage-	
		ment.	
sec.ci.008	Confidentiality	The Cloud Infrastructure must support	Workload Security
		tenant networks segregation.	

Table 2.13: Reference Model Requirements - Confidentiality and Integrity Requirements

Workload Security Requirements

(source Workload security requirements)

	mento		
Reference	sub-category	Description	Specification Reference
sec.wl.001	Workload	The Platform must support Workload	Workload Security
		placement policy.	
sec.wl.002	Workload	The Cloud Infrastructure provide meth-	
		ods to ensure the platform's trust sta-	
		tus and integrity (e.g., remote attestation,	
		Trusted Platform Module).	
sec.wl.003	Workload	The Platform must support secure provi-	Workload Security
		sioning of Workloads.	
sec.wl.004	Workload	The Platform must support Location as-	Workload Security
		sertion (for mandated in- country or lo-	
		cation requirements).	
sec.wl.005	Workload	The Platform must support the separation	This requirement's ver-
		of production and non- production Work-	ification goes beyond
		loads.	Anuket testing scope
sec.wl.006	Workload	The Platform must support the separation	Workload Security
		of Workloads based on their categorisa-	
		tion (for example, payment card informa-	
		tion, healthcare, etc.)	
sec.wl.007	Workload	The Operator must implement processes	
		and tools to verify verify NF authenticity	
		and integrity.	
	· · ·		•

Table 2.14: Reference Model Requirements - Workload Security Requirements

Image Security Requirements

(source Image Security)

	ments		
Reference	sub-category	Description	Specification Reference
sec.img.001	Image	Images from untrusted sources must not	Image Security
		be used.	
sec.img.002	Image	Images must be scanned to be maintained	Image Security
		free from known vulnerabilities.	
sec.img.003	Image	Images must not be configured to run	
		with privileges higher than the privileges	
		of the actor authorised to run them.	
sec.img.004	Image	Images must only be accessible to autho-	Integrity of OpenStack
		rised actors.	components configuration
sec.img.005	Image	Image Registries must only be accessible	Integrity of OpenStack
		to authorised actors.	components configuration
sec.img.006	Image	Image Registries must only be accessi-	Integrity of OpenStack
		ble over networks that enforce authenti-	components configuration
		cation, integrity and confidentiality.	
sec.img.007	Image	Image registries must be clear of vulner-	Image Security
		able and out of date versions.	
sec.img.008	Image	Images must not include any secrets. Se-	
		crets include passwords, cloud provider	
		credentials, SSH keys, TLS certificate	
		keys, etc.	

Table 2.15: Reference Model Requirements - Image Security Requirements

Security LCM Requirements

(source Security LCM)

Reference	sub-category	Description	Specification Reference
sec.lcm.001	LCM	The Platform must support Secure Pro-	Monitoring and Security
		visioning, Availability, and Deprovision-	Audit
		ing (Secure Clean-Up) of workload re-	
		sources where Secure Clean-Up includes	
		tear-down, defense against virus or other	
		attacks.	
sec.lcm.002	LCM	The Cloud Operator must use manage-	Security LCM
		ment protocols limiting security risk such	
		as SNMPv3, SSH v2, ICMP, NTP, syslog	
		and TLS v1.2 or higher.	
sec.lcm.003	LCM	The Cloud Operator must implement and	Monitoring and Security
		strictly follow change management pro-	Audit
		cesses for Cloud Infrastructure, Infras-	
		tructure Manager and other components	
		of the cloud, and Platform change control	
		on hardware.	
sec.lcm.005	LCM	Platform must provide logs and these logs	Monitoring and Security
		must be monitored for anomalous be-	Audit
		haviour.	
sec.lcm.006	LCM	The Platform must verify the integrity of	Confidentiality and In-
		all Resource management requests.	tegrity of tenant data
			(sec.ci.001)
sec.lcm.007	LCM	The Platform must be able to update	
section	Len	newly instantiated, suspended, hiber-	
		nated, migrated and restarted images with	
		current time information.	
sec.lcm.008	LCM	The Platform must be able to update	
		newly instantiated, suspended, hiber-	
		nated, migrated and restarted images with	
		relevant DNS information.	
sec.lcm.009	LCM	The Platform must be able to update the	
		tag of newly instantiated, suspended, hi-	
		bernated, migrated and restarted images	
		with relevant geolocation (geographical)	
		information.	
sec.lcm.010	LCM	The Platform must log all changes to	
50000000	2011	geolocation along with the mechanisms	
		and sources of location information (i.e.	
		GPS, IP block, and timing).	
sec.lcm.011	LCM	The Platform must implement Security	Patches
		life cycle management processes includ-	
		ing the proactive update and patching of	
		all deployed Cloud Infrastructure soft-	
		ware.	
sec.lcm.012	LCM	The Platform must log any access privi-	What to Log / What NOT
500.10111.012			to Log
		lege escalation.	to Log

Table 2.16: Reference Model Requirements - Security LCM Requirements

Monitoring and Security Audit Requirements

(source Monitoring and Security Audit)

The Platform is assumed to provide configurable alerting and notification capability and the operator is assumed to have automated systems, policies and procedures to act on alerts and notifications in a timely fashion. In the following the monitoring and logging capabilities can trigger alerts and notifications for appropriate action.

Reference	sub-category	Description	Specification Reference
sec.mon.001	Monitoring/Audit	Platform must provide logs and these logs	Required Fields
	<i>.</i>	must be regularly monitored for events of	
		interest. The logs must contain the fol-	
		lowing fields: event type, date/time, pro-	
		tocol, service or program used for access,	
		success/failure, login ID or process ID,	
		IP address and ports (source and destina-	
002		tion) involved.	
sec.mon.002	Monitoring	Security logs must be time synchronised.	Security Logs Time Syn
			chronisation
sec.mon.003	Monitoring	The Platform must log all changes to time	Security Logs Time Syn
		server source, time, date and time zones.	chronisation
sec.mon.004	Audit	The Platform must secure and protect	Security LCM
		Audit logs (containing sensitive informa-	
		tion) both in-transit and at rest.	
sec.mon.005	Monitoring/Audit	The Platform must Monitor and Audit	What to Log / What NO
		various behaviours of connection and lo-	to Log
		gin attempts to detect access attacks and	
		potential access attempts and take correc-	
		tive accordingly actions.	
sec.mon.006	Monitoring/Audit	The Platform must Monitor and Audit op-	Monitoring and Security
5 cc	Wollitoring// tudit	erations by authorised account access af-	Audit
		ter login to detect malicious operational	/ tuun
		activity and take corrective actions.	
sec.mon.007	Monitoring/Audit	The Platform must Monitor and Audit se-	Integrity of OpenStac
sec.mon.ou/	Monitor nig/Audit		
		curity parameter configurations for com-	components configuration
000		pliance with defined security policies.	
sec.mon.008	Monitoring/Audit	The Platform must Monitor and Audit ex-	Confidentiality and In
		ternally exposed interfaces for illegal ac-	tegrity of communication
		cess (attacks) and take corrective security	(sec.ci.001)
		hardening measures.	
sec.mon.009	Monitoring/Audit	The Platform must Monitor and Audit	Monitoring and Security
		service for various attacks (malformed	Audit
		messages, signalling flooding and replay-	
		ing, etc.) and take corrective actions ac-	
		cordingly.	
sec.mon.010	Monitoring/Audit	The Platform must Monitor and Audit	Monitoring and Securit
	e	running processes to detect unexpected or	Audit
		unauthorised processes and take correc-	
		tive actions accordingly.	
sec.mon.011	Monitoring/Audit	The Platform must Monitor and Audit	Creating Logs
500	infolintoring, ruan	logs from infrastructure elements and	
		workloads to detected anomalies in the	
		system components and take corrective	
ann mar 012	Moritania / A 11	actions accordingly.	Confident'slites and T
sec.mon.012	Monitoring/Audit	The Platform must Monitor and Audit	Confidentiality and In
		Traffic patterns and volumes to prevent	tegrity of tenant dat
		malware download attempts.	(sec.ci.001)
sec.mon.013	Monitoring	The monitoring system must not affect	
		the security (integrity and confidential-	
		ity) of the infrastructure, workloads, or	
		the user data (through back door entries)	
sec.mon.015	Monitoring	The Platform must ensure that the Mon-	Monitoring and Securit
		itoring systems are never starved of re-	Audit
		sources and must activate alarms when	
		resource utilisation exceeds a config-	

Table 2.17: Reference Model Requirements - Monitoring and Security Audit Requirements

Open-Source Software Security Requirements

(source Open-Source Software Security)

	curity Requirement	5	
Reference	sub-category	Description	Specification Reference
sec.oss.001	Software	Open-source code must be inspected by	
		tools with various capabilities for static	
		and dynamic code analysis.	
sec.oss.002	Software	The CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and	
		Exposures) must be used to identify vul-	
		nerabilities and their severity rating for	
		open-source code part of Cloud Infras-	
		tructure and workloads software.	
sec.oss.003	Software	Critical and high severity rated vulnera-	
		bilities must be fixed in a timely manner.	
		Refer to the CVSS (Common Vulnerabil-	
		ity Scoring System) to know a vulnera-	
		bility score and its associated rate (low,	
		medium, high, or critical)	
sec.oss.004	Software	A dedicated internal isolated repository	
		separated from the production environ-	
		ment must be used to store vetted open-	
		source content.	

 Table 2.18: Reference Model Requirements - Open-Source Software Security Requirements

laaC security Requirements

(source IaaC - Secure Design and Architecture Stage Requirements)

Secure Code Stage Requirements

Table 2.19: Reference Model Requirements:	IaaC Security Require-
ments, Secure Code Stage	

Reference	sub-category	Description	Specification Reference
sec.code.001	IaaC	SAST -Static Application Security Test-	
		ing must be applied during Secure Cod-	
		ing stage triggered by Pull, Clone or	
		Comment trigger. Security testing that	
		analyses application source code for soft-	
		ware vulnerabilities and gaps against	
		bestpractices. Example: open source	
		OWASP range of tools.	

Continuous Build, Integration and Testing Stage Requirements

Reference	sub-category	Description	Specification Reference
sec.bld.003	IaaC	Image Scan must be applied during the	
		Continuous Build, Integration and Test-	
		ing stage triggered by Package trigger,	
		example: A push of a container image	
		to a containerregistry may trigger a vul-	
		nerability scan before the image becomes	
		available in the registry.	

Table 2.20: Reference Model Requirements - IaaC Security Require-
ments, Continuous Build, Integration and Testing Stage

Continuous Delivery and Deployment Stage Requirements

Table 2.21: Reference Model Requirements - IaaC Security Requi	re-
ments, Continuous Delivery and Deployment Stage	

Reference	sub-category	Description	Specification Reference
sec.del.001	IaaC	Image Scan must be applied during the Continuous Delivery and Deployment stage triggered by Publish to Artifact and Image Repository trigger. Example: Git- Lab uses the open source Clair engine for container image scanning.	
sec.del.002	IaaC	Code Signing must be applied during the Continuous Deliveryand Deployment stage and Image Repository trigger. Code Signing provides authentication to assure that downloaded files are form the pub- lisher named on the certificate.	
sec.del.004	IaaC	Component Vulnerability Scan must be applied during the Continuous Delivery and Deployment stage triggered by In- stantiate Infrastructure trigger. The vul- nerability scanning system is deployed on the cloud platform to detect security vulnerabilities of specified components through scanning and to provide timely security protection. Example: OWASP Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP).	

Runtime Defence and Monitoring Requirements

Table 2.22: Reference Model Requirements - IaaC Security F	Require-
ments, Runtime Defence and Monitoring Stage	

Reference	sub-category	Description	Specification Reference	
sec.run.001	IaaC	Component Vulnerability Monitoring		
		must be continuously applied during the		
		Runtime Defence and monitoring stage.		
		Security technology that monitors com-		
		ponents like virtual servers and assesses		
		data, applications, and infrastructure		
		forsecurity risks.		

Compliance with Standards Requirements

(source Compliance with Standards)

Tuble 2.25. Reference Would Requirements. Comphanee with Standards				
Reference	sub-category	Description	Specification Reference	
sec.std.012	Standards	The Public Cloud Operator must, and		
		the Private Cloud Operator may be cer-		
		tified to be compliant with the Interna-		
		tional Standard on Awareness Engage-		
		ments (ISAE) 3402 (in the US:SSAE 16);		
		International Standard on Awareness En-		
		gagements (ISAE) 3402. US Equivalent:		
		SSAE16.		

Table 2.22. Defense as Madel Dee		nling on suith Cton dands
Table 2.23: Reference Model Req	juliements: Com	phance with Standards

2.3 Architecture and OpenStack Requirements

"Architecture" in this chapter refers to Cloud Infrastructure (referred to as NFVI by ETSI) + VIM (as specified in Reference Model Chapter 3).

General Requirements

Reference	sub-category	Description	Specification Reference	
gen.ost.01	Open source	The Architecture must use OpenStack	Consolidated Set of APIs	
		APIs.		
gen.ost.02	Open source	The Architecture must support dynamic	Consolidated Set of APIs request and configuration	
		virtual resources (compute, net-	request and comparation	
		work, storage) through OpenStack		
		APIs.		
		APIS.		
gen.rsl.01	Resiliency	The Architecture must support resilient		
		OpenStack components that are required		
		for the continued availability of running		
		workloads.		
gen.avl.01	Availability	The Architecture must provide High	Underlying Resources	
		Availability for OpenStack components.		

Table 2.24: General Requirements

Infrastructure Requirements

Reference	sub-category	Description	Specification Reference
inf.com.01	Compute	The Architecture must provide compute re-	Cloud Workload Services
111.0011.01	Compute	sources for instances.	Ciouu workioau Services
	<u> </u>		
inf.com.04	Compute	The Architecture must be able to support	Support for Cloud Infrastructure
		multiple CPU type options to support vari-	Profiles and flavors
		ous infrastructure profiles (Basic and High	
		Performance).	
inf.com.05	Compute	The Architecture must support Hardware	Support for Cloud Infrastructure
		Platforms with NUMA capabilities.	Profiles and flavors
inf.com.06	Compute	The Architecture must support CPU Pin-	Support for Cloud Infrastructure
	1	ning of the vCPUs of an instance.	Profiles and flavors
inf.com.07	Compute	The Architecture must support different	Cloud partitioning: Host Aggre-
	F	hardware configurations to support various	gates, Availability Zones
		infrastructure profiles (Basic and High Per-	gates, rivaliability Zolies
: 6 00	<u> </u>	formance).	
inf.com.08	Compute	The Architecture must support allocating	Cloud partitioning: Host Aggre-
		certain number of host cores for all non-	gates, Availability Zones
		tenant workloads such as for OpenStack ser-	
		vices. SMT threads can be allocated to indi-	
		vidual OpenStack services or their compo-	
		nents. Dedicating host cores to certain work-	
		loads (e.g., OpenStack services). Please see	
		example, Configuring libvirt compute nodes	
		for CPU pinning	
inf.com.09	Compute	The Architecture must ensure that the host	Pinned and Unpinned CPUs
m.com.o	compute	cores assigned to non-tenant and tenant	Thined and enplitted er es
		workloads are SMT aware: that is, a host	
		core and its associated SMT threads are ei-	
		ther all assigned to non-tenant workloads or	
		all assigned to tenant workloads.	
inf.stg.01	Storage	The Architecture must provide remote (not	Storage
		directly attached to the host) Block storage	
		for Instances.	
inf.stg.02	Storage	The Architecture must provide Object stor-	Swift
-	_	age for Instances. Operators may choose	
		not to implement Object Storage but must	
		be cognizant of the the risk of "Compliant	
		VNFs" failing in their environment.	
inf.nw.01	Network	The Architecture must provide virtual net-	Neutron
IIII.IIW.01	I WOIK	work interfaces to instances.	ricution
inf.nw.02	Network	The Architecture must include capabilities	Virtual Networking 2nd rate
1111.11W.02	INCLWOIK	1	Virtual Networking – 3rd party
		for integrating SDN controllers to support	SDN solution
		provisioning of network services, from the	
		SDN OpenStack Neutron service, such as	
		networking of VTEPs to the Border Edge	
		based VRFs.	
inf.nw.03	Network	The Architecture must support low latency	Network Fabric
		and high throughput traffic needs.	
inf.nw.05	Network	The Architecture must allow for East/West	Network Fabric
		tenant traffic within the cloud (via tunnelled	
		encapsulation overlay such as VXLAN or	
		Geneva	
inf nr 07	Notwork	The Architecture must support network re-	Natwork
inf.nw.07	Network		Network
		siliency	
inf.nw.10	Network	The Cloud Infrastructure Network Fabric	Network
		must be capable of enabling highly available	

Table 2.25: Infrastructure Requirements

VIM Requirements

Reference	sub-category	Description	Specification Reference
vim.01	General	The Architecture must allow infrastructure	Consumable Infrastructure Re-
		resource sharing.	sources and Services
vim.03	General	The Architecture must allow VIM to dis-	Placement
		cover and manage Cloud Infrastructure re-	
		sources.	
vim.05	General	The Architecture must include image repos-	Glance
		itory management.	
vim.07	General	The Architecture must support multi-	Multi-Tenancy (execution envi-
		tenancy.	ronment)
vim.08	General	The Architecture must support resource tag-	OpenStack Resource Tags
		ging.	

Table 2.26: VIM Requirements

Interfaces & APIs Requirements

Reference	sub-category	Description	Specification Reference
int.api.01	API	The Architecture must provide APIs to	Keystone
		access the authentication service and the	
		associated mandatory features detailed in	
		chapter 5	
int.api.02	API	The Architecture must provide APIs to	Glance
		access the image management service	
		and the associated mandatory features de-	
		tailed in chapter 5	
int.api.03	API	The Architecture must provide APIs to	Cinder
		access the block storage management ser-	
		vice and the associated mandatory fea-	
		tures detailed in chapter 5.	
int.api.04	API	The Architecture must provide APIs to	Swift
		access the object storage management	
		service and the associated mandatory fea-	
		tures detailed in chapter 5.	
int.api.05	API	The Architecture must provide APIs to	Neutron
		access the network management service	
		and the associated mandatory features de-	
		tailed in chapter 5.	
int.api.06	API	The Architecture must provide APIs to	Nova
		access the compute resources manage-	
		ment service and the associated manda-	
		tory features detailed in chapter 5.	
int.api.07	API	The Architecture must provide GUI ac-	Horizon
-		cess to tenant facing cloud platform core	
		services except at Edge/Far Edge clouds.	
int.api.08	API	The Architecture must provide APIs	Placement
		needed to discover and manage Cloud In-	
		frastructure resources.	
int.api.09	API	The Architecture must provide APIs to	Heat
-		access the orchestration service.	
int.api.10	API	The Architecture must expose the latest	Core OpenStack Services
÷		version and microversion of the APIs for	APIs
		the given Anuket OpenStack release for	
		each of the OpenStack core services.	

Table 2.27: Interfaces and APIs Requirements

Tenant Requirements

Reference	sub-category	Description	Specification Reference
tnt.gen.01	General	The Architecture must support self-	Horizon
		service dashboard (GUI) and APIs for	Cloud Workload Services
		users to deploy, configure and manage	
		their workloads.	

Table 2.28: Tenant Requirements

Operations and LCM

Reference	sub-category	Description	Specification Reference
lcm.gen.01	General	The Architecture must support zero	
		downtime of running workloads when the	
		number of compute hosts and/or the stor-	
		age capacity is being expanded or unused	
		capacity is being removed.	
lcm.adp.02	Automated de-	The Architecture must support upgrades	
	ployment	of software, provided by the cloud	
		provider, so that the running workloads	
		are not impacted (viz., hitless upgrades).	
		Please note that this means that the exist-	
		ing data plane services should not fail (go	
		down).	

Table 2.29: LCM Requirements

Assurance Requirements

Reference	sub-category	Description	Specification Reference
asr.mon.01	Integration	The Architecture must include integra-	
		tion with various infrastructure compo-	
		nents to support collection of telemetry	
		for assurance monitoring and network in-	
		telligence.	
asr.mon.03	Monitoring	The Architecture must allow for the col-	
		lection and dissemination of performance	
		and fault information.	
asr.mon.04	Network	The Cloud Infrastructure Network Fab-	
		ric and Network Operating System must	
		provide network operational visibility	
		through alarming and streaming teleme-	
		try services for operational management,	
		engineering planning, troubleshooting,	
		and network performance optimisation.	

 Table 2.30: Assurance Requirements

Architecture and OpenStack Recommendations

The requirements listed in this section are optional, and are not required in order to be deemed a conformant implementation.

General Recommendations

Reference	sub-category	Description	Notes
gen.cnt.01	Cloud native- ness	The Architecture should consist of stateless service components. However, where state is required it must be kept external to the component.	OpenStack consists of both stateless and stateful services where the stateful services utilise a database. For latter see Configuring the stateful services
gen.cnt.02	Cloud native- ness	The Architecture should consist of service components implemented as microservices that are individually dynamically scalable.	
gen.scl.01	Scalability	The Architecture should support policy driven auto-scaling.	This requirement is currently not addressed but will likely be sup- ported through Senlin, cluster management service.
gen.rsl.02	Resiliency	The Architecture should support resilient OpenStack service components that are not subject to gen.rsl.01.	

Table 2.31	General Recommendations	
14010 2.51.		

Infrastructure Recommendations

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Reference	sub-category	Description	Notes
inf.com.02	Compute	The Architecture should include industry	
		standard hardware management systems at	
		both HW device level (embedded) and HW	
		platform level (external to device).	
inf.com.03	Compute	The Architecture should support Symmetric	
	-	Multiprocessing with shared memory access	
		as well as Simultaneous Multithreading.	
inf.stg.08	Storage	The Architecture should allow use of exter-	
U	e	nally provided large archival storage for its	
		Backup / Restore / Archival needs.	
inf.stg.09	Storage	The Architecture should make available all	
111131810>	Storage	non-host OS / Hypervisor / Host systems	
		storage as network-based Block, File or Ob-	
		ject Storage for tenant/management con-	
		sumption.	
inf.stg.10	Storage	The Architecture should provide local	Virtual Storage
mi.stg.10	Storage	Block storage for Instances.	virtual Storage
inf.nw.04	Network	The Architecture should support service	
IIII.IIW.04	INELWOIK	11	
		function chaining.	
inf.nw.06	Network	The Architecture should support Dis-	
		tributed Virtual Routing (DVR) to allow	
		compute nodes to route traffic efficiently.	
inf.nw.08	Network	The Cloud Infrastructure Network Fabric	
		should embrace the concepts of open net-	
		working and disaggregation using commod-	
		ity networking hardware and disaggregated	
		Network Operating Systems.	
inf.nw.09	Network	The Cloud Infrastructure Network Fabric	
		should embrace open-based standards and	
		technologies.	
inf.nw.11	Network	The Cloud Infrastructure Network Fabric	
		should be architected to provide a standard-	
		ised, scalable, and repeatable deployment	
		model across all applicable Cloud Infras-	
		tructure sites.	
inf.nw.17	Network	The Architecture should use dual stack IPv4	
		and IPv6 for Cloud Infrastructure internal	
		networks.	
inf.acc.01	Acceleration	The Architecture should support Appli-	Acceleration
		cation Specific Acceleration (exposed to	
		VNFs).	
inf.acc.02	Acceleration	The Architecture should support Cloud In-	OpenStack Future - Specs de-
	reconclution	frastructure Acceleration (such as Smart-	fined
		NICs).	
inf.acc.03	Acceleration	The Architecture may rely on on SR-IOV	
111.acc.05	Acceleration	PCI-Pass through to provide acceleration to	
		VNFs.	
infime 01	Image	The Architecture should make the im-	Clance
inf.img.01	Image		Glance
		mutable images available via location inde-	
		pendent means.	

Table 2.32: Infrastructure Recommendations

VIM Recommendations

Reference	sub-category	Description	Notes
vim.02	General	The Architecture should support deploy-	Containerised OpenStack Ser-
		ment of OpenStack components in contain-	vices
		ers.	
vim.04	General	The Architecture should support Enhanced	
		Platform Awareness (EPA) only for discov-	
		ery of infrastructure resource capabilities.	
vim.06	General	The Architecture should allow orchestration	
		solutions to be integrated with VIM.	
vim.09	General	The Architecture should support horizontal	
		scaling of OpenStack core services.	

Table 2.33: VIM Recommendations

Interfaces and APIs Recommendations

Table 2.34: Interfaces and APIs Recommendation	ons
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Reference	sub-category	Description	Notes
int.acc.01	Acceleration	The Architecture should provide an open	
		and standard acceleration interface to VNFs.	
int.acc.02	Acceleration	The Architecture should not rely on SR-IOV	duplicate of inf.acc.03 under
		PCI-Pass through for acceleration interface	"Infrastructure Recommenda-
		exposed to VNFs."	tion"

Tenant Recommendations

This section is left blank for future use.

Table 2.35: Tenant Recommendations

Reference	sub-category	Description	Notes

Operations and LCM Recommendations

Reference	sub-category	Description	Notes
lcm.adp.01	Automated	The Architecture should allow for cookie	
	deployment	cutter automated deployment, configuration,	
		provisioning and management of multiple	
		Cloud Infrastructure sites.	
lcm.adp.03	Automated	The Architecture should support hitless up-	
	deployment	grade of all software provided by the cloud	
		provider that are not covered by lcm.adp.02.	
		Whenever hitless upgrades are not feasible,	
		attempt should be made to minimise the du-	
		ration and nature of impact.	
lcm.adp.04	Automated	The Architecture should support declarative	
	deployment	specifications of hardware and software as-	
		sets for automated deployment, configura-	
		tion, maintenance and management.	
lcm.adp.05	Automated	The Architecture should support automated	
	deployment	process for Deployment and life-cycle man-	
		agement of VIM Instances.	
lcm.cid.02	CI/CD	The Architecture should support integrating	
		with CI/CD Toolchain for Cloud Infrastruc-	
		ture and VIM components Automation.	

Table 2.36: LCM Recommendations

Assurance Recommendations

Table 2.37: Assurance Recommendat	tions
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Reference	sub-category	Description	Notes
asr.mon.02	Monitoring	The Architecture should support Network	
		Intelligence capabilities that allow richer di-	
		agnostic capabilities which take as input	
		broader set of data across the network and	
		from VNF workloads.	

Security Recommendations

System Hardening Recommendations

(source System Hardening)

Reference	sub-category	Description	Notes
sec.gen.011	Hardening	The Cloud Infrastructure should support	
		Read and Write only storage partitions	
		(write only permission to one or more au-	
		thorised actors).	
sec.gen.014	Hardening	All servers part of Cloud Infrastructure	
		should support measured boot and an at-	
		testation server that monitors the measure-	
		ments of the servers.	

Table 2.38: System Hardening Recommendations

Platform and Access Recommendations

(source Platform and Access)

Table 2 39	Platform a	nd Access	Recommendations
14010 2.07.	I futiof fill u		recommendations

Reference	sub-category	Description	Notes
sec.sys.014	Access	The Platform should use Linux Security	
		Modules such as SELinux to control access	
		to resources.	
sec.sys.020	Access	The Cloud Infrastructure architecture	Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA)
		should rely on Zero Trust principles to	described in NIST SP 800-207
		build a secure by design environment.	

Confidentiality and Integrity Recommendations

(source Confidentiality and Integrity)

Reference	sub-category	Description	Notes
sec.ci.002	Confidential-	The Platform should support self-	
	ity/Integrity	encrypting storage devices.	
sec.ci.009	Confidential-	For sensitive data encryption, the key man-	
	ity/Integrity	agement service should leverage a Hard-	
		ware Security Module to manage and protect	
		cryptographic keys.	

Table 2.40: Confidentiality and Integrity Recommendations

Workload Security Recommendations

(source Workload Security)

Table 2.41:	Workload	Security	Recommendations
14010 -111		Security	1000011110110110110

Reference	sub-category	Description	Notes
sec.wl.007	Workload	The Operator should implement processes	
		and tools to verify VNF authenticity and in-	
		tegrity.	

Image Security Recommendations

(source Image Security)

This section is left blank for future use.

Table 2 42.	Image	Security	Recommendations
1abic 2.42.	image	Security	Recommendations

Reference	sub-category	Description	Notes
sec.img.009	Image	CIS Hardened Images should be used when-	
		ever possible.	
sec.img.010	Image	Minimalist base images should be used whenever possible.	

Security LCM Recommendations

(source Security LCM)

Table 2.43: LCM Security	Recommendations
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Reference	sub-category	Description	Notes
sec.lcm.004	LCM	The Cloud Operator should support auto-	
		mated templated approved changes; Tem-	
		plated approved changes for automation	
		where available	

Monitoring and Security Audit Recommendations

(source Monitoring and Security Audit)

The Platform is assumed to provide configurable alerting and notification capability and the operator is assumed to have automated systems, policies and procedures to act on alerts and notifications in a timely fashion. In the following the monitoring and logging capabilities can trigger alerts and notifications for appropriate action.

Reference	sub-category	Description	Notes
sec.mon.014	Monitoring	The Monitoring systems should not impact	
	C C	IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS SLAs including avail-	
		ability SLAs	
sec.mon.016	Monitoring	The Platform Monitoring components	
		should follow security best practices for	
		auditing, including secure logging and	
		tracing	

Table 2.44: Monitoring and Security Audit Recommendations

Open-Source Software Security Recommendations

(source Open Source Software)

Table 2.45:	Open-Source Software	e Security Recommendations
-------------	-----------------------------	----------------------------

Reference	sub-category	Description	Notes
sec.oss.005	Software	A Software Bill of Materials (SBOM)	NTIA SBOM
		should be provided or build, and maintained	
		to identify the software components and	
		their origins. Inventory of software compo-	
		nents	

laaC security Recommendations

(source IaaC - Secure Design and Architecture Stage Requirements)

Secure Design and Architecture Stage

Table 2.46: Reference Model Requirements: IaaC Security, Design and	
Architecture Stage	

Reference	sub-category	Description	Notes
sec.arch.001	IaaC	Threat Modelling methodologies and tools should be used during the Secure Design and Architecture stage triggered by Soft- ware Feature Design trigger. Methodology to identify and understand threats impacting a resource or set of resources.	It may be done manually or using tools like open source OWASP Threat Dragon
sec.arch.002	IaaC	Security Control Baseline Assessment should be performed during the Secure Design and Architecture stage triggered by Software Feature Design trigger.	Typically done manually by in- ternal or independent assessors.

Secure Code Stage Recommendations

	Stuge		
Reference	sub-category	Description	Notes
sec.code.002	IaaC	SCA – Software Composition Analysis	Example: open source OWASP
		should be applied during Secure Coding	range of tools.
		stage triggered by Pull, Clone or Comment	
		trigger. Security testing that analyses ap-	
		plication source code or compiled code for	
		software components with known vulnera-	
		bilities.	
sec.code.003	IaaC	Source Code Review should be performed	Typically done manually.
		continuously during Secure Coding stage.	
sec.code.004	IaaC	Integrated SAST via IDE Plugins should be	
		used during Secure Coding stage triggered	
		by Developer Code trigger. On the local	
		machine: through the IDE or integrated test	
		suites; triggered on completion of coding by	
		developer.	
sec.code.005	IaaC	SAST of Source Code Repo should be per-	
		formed during Secure Coding stage trig-	
		gered by Developer Code trigger. Contin-	
		uous delivery pre -deployment: scanning	
		prior to deployment.	

Table 2.47: Reference Model Requirements: IaaC Security, Secure Code Stage

Continuous Build, Integration and Testing Stage Recommendations

Table 2.48: Reference Model Requirements: IaaC Security, Continuous
Build, Integration and Testing Stage

Reference	sub-category	Description	Notes
sec.bld.001	IaaC	SAST -Static Application Security Testing should be applied during the Continuous Build, Integration and Testing stage trig- gered by Build and Integrate trigger.	Example: open source OWASP range of tools.
sec.bld.002	IaaC	SCA – Software Composition Analysis should be applied during the Continuous Build, Integration and Testing stage trig- gered by Build and Integrate trigger.	Example: open source OWASP range of tools.
sec.bld.004	IaaC	SDAST – Dynamic Application Security Testing should be applied during the Con- tinuous Build, Integration and Testing stage triggered by Stage & Test trigger. Security testing that analyses a running application by exercising application functionality and de- tecting vulnerabilities based on application behaviour and response.	Example: OWASP ZAP.
sec.bld.005	IaaC	Fuzzing should be applied during the Con- tinuous Build, Integration and testing stage triggered by Stage & Test trigger. Fuzzing or fuzz testing is an automated software testing technique that involves providing in- valid, unexpected, or random data as inputs to a computer program.	Example: GitLab Open Sources Protocol Fuzzer Community Edition.
sec.bld.006	IaaC	IAST – Interactive Application Security Testing should be applied during the Con- tinuous Build, Integration and Testing stage triggered by Stage & Test trigger. Soft- ware component deployed with an applica- tion that assesses application behaviour and detects presence of vulnerabilities on an ap- plication being exercised in realistic testing scenarios.	Example: Contrast Community Edition.

Continuous Delivery and Deployment Stage Recommendations

Table 2.49: Reference Model Requirements: IaaC Security, ContinuousDelivery and Deployment Stage

Reference	sub-category	Description	Notes	
sec.del.003	IaaC	Artifact and Image Repository Scan should	Example: GitLab uses the open	
		be continuously applied during the Continu-	source Clair engine for container	
		ous Delivery and Deployment stage.	scanning.	

Runtime Defence and Monitoring Recommendations

Reference	sub-category	Description	Notes
sec.run.002	IaaC	RASP – Runtime Application Self- Protection should be continuously applied during the Runtime Defence and Monitor- ing stage. Security technology deployed within the target application in production for detecting, alerting, and blocking attacks.	
sec.run.003	IaaC	Application testing and Fuzzing should be continuously applied during the Runtime Defence and Monitoring stage. Fuzzing or fuzz testing is an automated software testing technique that involves providing invalid, unexpected, or random data as inputs to a computer program.	Example: GitLab Open Sources Protocol Fuzzer Community Edition.
sec.run.004	IaaC	Penetration Testing should be continuously applied during the Runtime Defence and Monitoring stage.	Typically done manually.

Table 2.50: Reference Model Requirements: Iaac Security, Runtime Defence and Monitoring Stage

Compliance with Standards Recommendations

(source Compliance with Standards)

Reference	sub-category	Description	Notes		
sec.std.001	Standards	The Cloud Operator should comply with			
		Center for Internet Security CIS Controls			
sec.std.002	Standards	The Cloud Operator, Platform and Work-			
		loads should follow the guidance in the CSA			
		Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Fo-			
		cus in Cloud Computing (latest version)-			
		CSA, Cloud Security Alliance			
sec.std.003	Standards	The Platform and Workloads should follow			
		the guidance in the OWASP Cheat Sheet Se-			
		ries (OCSS) - OWASP, Open Web Applica-			
		tion Security Project			
sec.std.004	Standards	The Cloud Operator, Platform and Work-			
		loads should ensure that their code is not			
		vulnerable to the OWASP Top Ten Security			
		Risks			
sec.std.005	Standards	The Cloud Operator, Platform and Work-			
		loads should strive to improve their maturity			
		on the OWASP Software Maturity Model			
		(SAMM)			
sec.std.006	Standards	The Cloud Operator, Platform and Work-			
		loads should utilise the OWASP Web Secu-			
		rity Testing Guide			
sec.std.007	Standards	The Cloud Operator, and Platform should			
		satisfy the requirements for Information			
		Management Systems specified in ISO/IEC			
		27001; ISO/IEC 27001 is the international			
		Standard for best-practice information secu-			
		rity management systems (ISMSs)			
sec.std.008	Standards	The Cloud Operator, and Platform should			
		implement the Code of practice for Security			
		Controls specified ISO/IEC 27002:2013 (or			
		latest)			
sec.std.009	Standards	The Cloud Operator, and Platform should			
		implement the ISO/IEC 27032:2012 (or			
		latest) Guidelines for Cybersecurity tech-			
		niques; ISO/IEC 27032 is the international			
		Standard focusing explicitly on cybersecu-			
		rity			
sec.std.010	Standards	The Cloud Operator should conform to the			
		ISO/IEC 27035 standard for incidence man-			
		agement; ISO/IEC 27035 is the international			
		Standard for incident management			
sec.std.011	Standards	The Cloud Operator should conform to the			
		ISO/IEC 27031 standard for business conti-			
		nuity; ISO/IEC 27031 - ISO/IEC 27031 is			
		the international Standard for ICT readiness			
		for business continuity			

3 Cloud Infrastructure Architecture - OpenStack

3.1 Introduction

This Reference Architecture (RA-1) aims to provide an OpenStack distribution agnostic reference architecture that includes the Network Function Virtualisation Infrastructure (NFVI) and Virtual Infrastructure Manager (VIM). The different OpenStack distributions, without the not up-streamed vendor specific enhancements, are assumed to be Anuket conformant. This Reference Architecture allows operators to provide a common OpenStack-based architecture for any Anuket compliant VNF to be deployed and operated as expected. The purpose of this chapter is to outline all the components required to provide the Cloud Infrastructure (NFVI and the VIM) in a consistent and reliable way.

OpenStack is already very well documented and, hence, this document will describe the specific OpenStack services and features, Cloud Infrastructure features and how we expect them to be implemented.

This reference architecture provides optionality in terms of pluggable components such as SDN, hardware acceleration and support tools.

The Cloud Infrastructure layer includes the physical infrastructure which is then offered as virtual resources via a hypervisor. The VIM is the OpenStack Wallaby release.

This chapter is organised as follows:

- Consumable Infrastructure Resources and Services: these are infrastructure services and resources being exposed northbound for consumption
 - Multi-tenancy with quotas
 - * Virtual compute: vCPU / vRAM
 - * Virtual storage: Ephemeral, Persistent and Image
 - * Virtual networking neutron standalone: network plugin, virtual switch, accelerator features
 - * Virtual networking 3rd party SDN solution
 - * Additional network services: Firewall, DC Gateway
- Cloud Infrastructure Management Software (VIM): is how we manage the Consumable Infrastructure Resources and Services
 - VIM Core services (keystone, cinder, nova, neutron etc.)
 - * Tenant Separation
 - * Host aggregates providing resource pooling
 - * Flavor* management
- Underlying Resources: are what provides the resources that allow the Consumable Infrastructure Resources and Services to be created and managed by the Cloud Infrastructure Management Software (VIM).
 - Virtualisation
 - Physical infrastructure
 - * Compute
 - * Network: Spine/Leaf; East/West and North/South traffic
 - * Storage
- Please note "flavours" is used in the Reference Model and shall continue to be used in the context of specifying the geometry of the virtual resources. The term "flavor" is used in this document in the OpenStack context including

when specifying configurations; the OpenStack term flavor includes the profile configuration information as "extra specs".

3.2 Consumable Infrastructure Resources and Services

This section will describe the different services that are exposed for the VNF consumption within the execution zone:

- Tenants: to provide isolated environments
- Virtual Compute: to provide computing resources
- Virtual Storage: to provide storage capacity and performance
- Virtual networking: to provide connectivity within the Cloud Infrastructure and with external networks

Multi-Tenancy (execution environment)

The multi tenancy service permits hosting of several VNF projects with the assurance of isolated environments for each project. Tenants or confusingly "Projects" in OpenStack are isolated environments that enable workloads to be logically separated from each other with:

- · differentiated set of associated users
- role-based access of two levels admin or member (see RBAC).
- quota system to provide maximum resources that can be consumed.

This RA does not intend to restrict how workloads are distributed across tenants.

Virtual Compute (vCPU and vRAM)

The virtual compute resources (vCPU and vRAM) used by the VNFs behave like their physical counterparts. A physical core is an actual processor and can support multiple vCPUs through Simultaneous Multithreading (SMT) and CPU overbooking. With no overbooking and SMT of 2 (2 threads per core), each core can support 2 vCPUs. With the same SMT of 2 and overbooking factor of 4, each core can support 8 vCPUs. The performance of a vCPU can be affected by various configurations such as CPU pinning, NUMA alignment, and SMT.

The configuration of the virtual resources will depend on the software and hardware profiles and the flavour (resource sizing) needed to host VNF components. Profiles are defined in the Profiles, Profile Extensions & Flavours.

Virtual Storage

The Reference Model Storage for Tenant Consumption details consumption models for tenants: Platform native, object storage, shared file storage and archival. The choice of a solution will depend on the storage use case needs.

The two storage services offered by Cloud Infrastructure are:

- Persistent storage
- Ephemeral storage

The OpenStack services, Cinder for block storage and Swift for Object Storage, are discussed below in Section 3.3 "Cloud Infrastructure Management Software (VIM)".

Ephemeral data is typically stored on the compute host's local disks, in the form of a file system as part of the provisioning. This storage is volatile, it is deleted when instances are stopped. In environments that support live instance migration between compute hosts, the ephemeral data would need to be stored in a storage system shared between the compute hosts such as on persistent block or object storage. Three types of persistent data storage are supported in OpenStack:

- Block storage
- Object storage
- Shared file systems storage

The OpenStack Storage Table explains the differences between the storage types and typical use cases.

Block storage is dedicated to persistent data. Data is stored in the form of volumes. Block storage is managed by OpenStack Cinder service and storage Backends. OpenStack compatible storage backend drivers table lists the storage backends compatible with Cinder and their capabilities.

The Object storage is a persistent data storage, not attached to an instance. Data is accessed via API. Object storage is managed by OpenStack Swift.

Images are persistent data, stored using the OpenStack Glance service.

Cinder, Swift, and Glance services are discussed in the section Virtualised Infrastructure Manager (VIM).

Virtual Networking Neutron standalone

Neutron is an OpenStack project that provides "network connectivity as a service" between interface devices (e.g., vNICs) managed by other OpenStack services (e.g., Nova). Neutron allows users to create networks, subnets, ports, routers etc. Neutron also facilitates traffic isolation between different subnets - within as well as across project(s) by using different type drivers/mechanism drivers that use VLANs, VxLANs, GRE (Generic Routing Encapsulation) tunnels etc. For Neutron API consumer, this is abstracted and provided by Neutron. Multiple network segments are supported by Neutron via ML2 plugins to simultaneously utilise variety of layer 2 networking technologies like VLAN, VxLAN, GRE etc. Neutron also allows to create routers to connect layer 2 networks via "neutron-13-agent". In addition, floating IP support is also provided that allows a project VM to be accessed using a public IP.

Virtual Networking – 3rd party SDN solution

SDN (Software Defined Networking) controllers separate control and data (user) plane functions where the control plane programmatically configures and controls all network data path elements via open APIs. Open Networking Forum (ONF) defines SDN as "Software-Defined Networking (SDN) is an emerging architecture that is dynamic, manageable, cost-effective, and adaptable, making it ideal for the high-bandwidth, dynamic nature of today's applications. This architecture decouples the network control and forwarding functions enabling the network control to become directly programmable and the underlying infrastructure to be abstracted for applications and network services."

The key messages of the SDN definition are:

- Decoupling of control and forwarding functions into control plane and data plane
- Networking capabilities that can be instantiated, deployed, configured and managed like software. Network control is programmable and supports dynamic, manageable and adaptable networking.
- Support for both overlay and underlay networking

OpenStack Neutron supports open APIs and a pluggable backend where different plugins can be incorporated in the neutron-server.

Plugins for various SDN controllers include either the standard ML-2 plugin or specific monolithic plugins. Neutron supports both core plugins that deal with L2 connectivity and IP address management, and service plugins that support services such as L3 routing, Load Balancers, Firewalls, etc.

Below we will explore an example of an SDN controller from LFN projects, that can be integrated with a Neutron plugin, to help overcome a number of shortcomings of the vanilla Neutron and provide many needed features that can be consumed by VNF/CNF.

Tungsten Fabric (SDN Controller)

Tungsten Fabric, an open source SDN in Linux Foundation Networking, offers neutron networking through ML2 based plugin, additionally it supports advanced networking features beyond basic neutron networking via monolithic plugin. It also supports the same advanced networking features via CNI plugin in Kubernetes. Hence, it works as a multi-stack SDN to support VMs, containers, and baremetal workloads. It provides separation of control plane functions and data plane functions with its two components:

- Tungsten Fabric Controller– a set of software services that maintains a model of networks and network policies, typically running on several servers for high availability
- Tungsten Fabric vRouter-installed in each host that runs workloads (virtual machines or containers), the vRouter performs packet forwarding and enforces network and security policies

It is based on proven, standards-based networking technologies but repurposed to work with virtualised workloads and cloud automation in data centres that can range from large scale enterprise data centres to much smaller telco DC (aka POPs). It provides many enhanced features over the native networking implementations of orchestrators, including:

- Highly scalable, multi-tenant networking
- Multi-tenant IP address management
- DHCP, ARP proxies to avoid flooding into networks
- Efficient edge replication for broadcast and multicast traffic
- Local, per-tenant DNS resolution
- Distributed firewall with access control lists
- Application-based security policies
- Distributed load balancing across hosts
- Network address translation (1:1 floating IPs and distributed SNAT)
- Service chaining with virtual network functions
- Dual stack IPv4 and IPv6
- BGP peering with gateway routers
- BGP as a Service (BGPaaS) for distribution of routes between privately managed customer networks and service provider networks

Based on the network layering concepts introduced in the Reference Model Section Network, the Tungsten Fabric Controller performs functions of both the SDN underlay (SDNu) and overlay (SDNo) controllers.

The SDN controller exposes a NB API that can be consumed by ETSI MANO for VNF/CNF onboarding, network service onboarding and dynamic service function chaining.

Acceleration

Acceleration deals with both hardware and software accelerations. Hardware acceleration is the use of specialised hardware to perform some function faster than is possible by executing the same function on a general-purpose CPU or on a traditional networking (or other I/O) device (e.g., NIC, switch, storage controller, etc.). The hardware accelerator covers the options for ASICs, SmartNIC, FPGAs, GPU etc. to offload the main CPU, and to accelerate workload performance. Cloud Infrastructure should manage the accelerators by plugins and provide the acceleration capabilities to VNFs.

With the acceleration abstraction layer defined, hardware accelerators as well as software accelerators can be abstracted as a set of acceleration functions (or acceleration capabilities) which exposes a common API to either the VNF or the host.

3.3 Virtualised Infrastructure Manager (VIM)

The Cloud Infrastructure Management Software (VIM) provides the services for the management of Consumable Resources/Services.

VIM Core services

OpenStack is a complex, multi-project framework, and so we will initially focus on the core services required to provide Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) as this is generally all that is required for Cloud Infrastructure/VIM use cases. Other components are optional and provide functionality above and beyond Cloud Infrastructure/VIM requirements.

The architecture consists of the core services shown in the Figure 3-1; Ironic is an optional OpenStack service needed only for bare-metal containers. The rest of this document will address the specific Anuket conformant implementation requirements and recommendations for the core services.




Figure 3-1: OpenStack Core Services

We will refer to the functions above as falling into the following categories to avoid any confusion with other terminology that may be used:

- Foundation node
- Control nodes

- Compute nodes
- Other supporting service nodes e.g. network, shared storage, logging, monitoring and alerting.

Each deployment of OpenStack should be a unique cloud with its own API endpoint. Sharing underlying cloud resources across OpenStack clouds is not recommended.

OpenStack Services Topology

OpenStack software services are distributed over 2 planes:

- Control Plane that hosts all Control and Management services
- Data Plane (a.k.a. User plane) that provides physical and virtual resources (compute, storage and networking) for the actual virtual workloads to run.

The architecture based on OpenStack technology relies on different types of nodes associated with specific roles:

- · Controller node types with control and management services, which include VIM functionalities
- Compute node types running workloads
- Network node types offering L3 connectivity
- Storage node types offering external attached storage (block, object, flat files)

The data plane consists of the compute nodes. It is typical to consider the other node types to be part of the control plane. Figure 3-2 depicts the 4 types of nodes constitutive of the Infrastructure: control, compute, network and storage nodes.






Figure 3-2: OpenStack Services Topology

Deployments can be structured using the distribution of services amongst the 4 node types as depicted in Figure 3-2, but depending on workloads requirements, OpenStack services can also be hosted on the same nodes. For instance, services related to Controller, network and storage roles can be hosted on controller nodes.

Foundation Services

To build and lifecycle manage an OpenStack cloud, it is typically necessary to deploy a server or virtual machine as a deployment node or foundation node.

This function must be able to manage the bare-metal provisioning of the hardware resources but since this does not affect cloud execution it can be detached from the OpenStack cloud and an operator can select their own tooling as they wish. Functional requirements of this node include:

- Build the cloud (control, compute, storage, network hardware resources)
- Patch management / upgrades / change management
- Grow / Shrink resources

Cloud Controller Services

The following OpenStack components are deployed on the Infrastructure. Some of them will be only deployed on control hosts and some of them will be deployed within both control and compute hosts. The table below also maps the OpenStack core services to the Reference Model (RM) Virtual Infrastructure Manager.

		1. OpenStack components dep			
RM Management Soft-	Service	Description	Required /	Deployed	Deployed
ware			Optional	on Con-	on Com-
				troller	pute
				Nodes	Nodes
Identity Management	Keystone	the authentication service	Required	X	
(Additional Management					
Functions) + Catalogue					
Storage Resources Man-	Glance	the image management	Required	X	
ager		service			
Storage Resources Man-	Cinder	the block storage manage-	Required	Х	
ager		ment service			
Storage Resources Man-	Swift	the Object storage man-	Required	X	
ager		agement service			
Network Resources Man- Neutron		the network management	X	Х	
ager		service			
Compute Resources In-	Placement	resource provider inven-	Required	X	
ventory		tory service			
Compute Resources Man-	Nova	the compute resources	Required	X	X
ager + Scheduler		management service			
Compute Resources Man-	Ironic	the Bare Metal Provision-	Optional	X	X
ager		ing service			
(Tool that utilises APIs)	s) Heat the orchestration service Required		Required	X	
UI Horizon		the WEB UI service	Required	X	
Key Manager	Barbican	the secret data manage-	Optional	X	
		ment service			
Acceleration Resources	Cyborg	the acceleration resources	Optional	X	Х
Manager		and their life cycle man-			
		agement			

 Table 3.1: OpenStack components deployment

All components must be deployed within a high available architecture that can withstand at least a single node failure and respects the anti-affinity rules for the location of the services (i.e. instances of a same service must run on different nodes).

The services can be containerised or VM hosted as long as they provide the high availability principles described above. The APIs for these OpenStack services are listed in Interfaces and APIs.

Cloud Workload Services

This section describes the core set of services and service components needed to run workloads; instances (such as VMs), their networks and storage are referred to as the "Compute Node Services" (a.k.a. user or data plane services). Contrast this with the Controller nodes which host OpenStack services used for cloud administration and management. The Compute Node Services include virtualisation, hypervisor instance creation/deletion, networking and storage services; some of these activities include RabbitMQ queues in the control plane including the scheduling, networking and cinder volume creation/attachment.

- Compute, Storage, Network services:
 - Nova Compute service: nova-compute (creating/deleting servers (a.k.a. instances))
 - Neutron Networking service: neutron-l2-agent (manage local Open vSwitch (OVS) configuration), VXLAN
 - Local Storage (Ephemeral, Root, etc.)
 - Attached Storage (using Local drivers)

Tenant Isolation

In Keystone v1 and v2 (both deprecated), the term "tenant" was used in OpenStack. With Keystone v3, the term "project" got adopted and both the terms became interchangeable. According to OpenStack glossary, Projects represent the base unit of resources (compute, storage and network) in OpenStack, in that all assigned resources in OpenStack are owned by a specific project. OpenStack offers multi-tenancy by means of resource (compute, network and storage)separation via projects. OpenStack offers ways to share virtual resources between projects while maintaining logical separation. As an example, traffic separation is provided by creating different VLAN ids for neutron networks of different projects. As another example, if host separation is needed, nova scheduler offers AggregateMultiTenancyIsolation scheduler filter to separate projects in host aggregates. Thus, if a host in an aggregate is configured for a particular project, only the instances from that project are placed on the host. Overall, tenant isolation ensures that the resources of a project are not affected by resources of another project.

This document uses the term "project" when referring to OpenStack services and "tenant" (RM Section Virtual Resources) to represent an independently manageable logical pool of resources.

Cloud partitioning: Host Aggregates, Availability Zones

Cloud administrators can partition the hosts within an OpenStack cloud using Host Aggregates and Availability Zones.

A Host Aggregate is a group of hosts (compute nodes) with specific characteristics and with the same specifications, software and/or hardware properties. Example would be a Host Aggregate created for specific hardware or performance characteristics. The administrator assigns key-value pairs to Host Aggregates, these are then used when scheduling VMs. A host can belong to multiple Host Aggregates. Host Aggregates are not explicitly exposed to tenants.

Availability Zones (AZs) rely on Host Aggregates and make the partitioning visible to tenants. They are defined by attaching specific metadata information to an aggregate, making the aggregate visible for tenants. Hosts can only be in a single Availability Zone. By default a host is part of a default Availability Zone, even if it doesn't belong to an aggregate. Availability Zones can be used to provide resiliency and fault tolerance for workloads deployments, for example by means of physical hosting distribution of Compute Nodes in separate racks with separate power supply and eventually in different rooms. They permit rolling upgrades – an AZ at a time upgrade with enough time between AZ upgrades to allow recovery of tenant workloads on the upgraded AZ. AZs can also be used to seggregate workloads.

An over use of Host Aggregates and Availability Zones can result in a granular partition of the cloud and, hence, operational complexities and inefficiencies.

Flavor management

In OpenStack a flavor defines the compute, memory, and storage capacity of nova instances. When instances are spawned, they are mapped to flavors which define the available hardware configuration for them. For simplicity, operators may create named flavors specifying both the sizing and the software and hardware profile configurations.

3.4 Underlying Resources

The number of Compute nodes (for workloads) determines the load on the controller nodes and networking traffic and, hence, the number of controller nodes needed in the OpenStack cloud; the number of controller nodes required is determined on the load placed on these controller nodes and the need for High availability and quorum requires at least 3 instances of many of the services on these controller nodes.

Virtualisation

Virtualisation is a technology that enables a guest Operating System (OS) to be abstracted from the underlying hardware and software. This allows to run multiple Virtual Machines(VMs) on the same hardware. Each such VMs have their own OS and are isolated from each other i.e. application running on one VM does not have the access to resources of another VM. Such virtualisation is supported by various hypervisors available as open-source (KVM, Xen, etc.) as well as commercial (Hyper-V, Citrix XenServer, etc.). Selecting a hypervisor depends on the workload needs and the features provided by various hypervisors as illustrated in Hypervisor Feature Support Matrix. OpenStack (Nova) allows the use of various hypervisors within a single installation by means of scheduler filters like ComputeFilter, ImagePropertiesFilter etc.

Virtualisation Services: The OpenStack nova-compute service supports multiple hypervisors natively or through libvirt. The preferred supported hypervisor in this Reference Architecture is KVM.

Note: Other hypervisors (such as ESXi) can also be supported as long as they can interoperate with other OpenStack components (e.g., those listed in this Reference Architecture) using standard interfaces and APIs as specified in Chapter 5.

Physical Infrastructure

The aim is to specify the requirements on deploying the VIM, from ground up (in a shipping container), and what resources are required of the DC (Data Centre).

- Servers
 - Compute
 - Storage
 - Control (min 3 for Core DC)
- Network considerations
 - Data centre gateway
 - Firewall (around the control plane, storage, etc.)
 - Data centre network fabric / Clos (spine/leaf) Horizontal scale
 - Storage networking, control plane and data plane

- Raw packet tenant networking allowing "wild west" connection
- Storage
 - Storage technologies are multiple, they are extensively described in Storage Implementation Stereotypes. Storage backends are discussed in Storage Backend.
- Acceleration
 - SmartNIC
 - GPU
 - FPGA


Compute

Cloud Infrastructure physical Nodes

The physical resources required for the Cloud Infrastructure are mainly based on COTS x86 hardware for control and data plane nodes. HW profiles are defined in Reference Model chapters Cloud Infrastructure Hardware Profile description and Cloud Infrastructure Hardware Profiles features and requirements..

Network

The recommended network architecture is spine and leaf topology.






Figure 3-3 shows a physical network layout where each physical server is dual homed to TOR (Leaf/Access) switches with redundant (2x) connections. The Leaf switches are dual homed with redundant connections to spines.

Storage

OpenStack supports many different storage architectures and backends. The choice of a particular backend storage is driven by a number of factors including: scalability, resiliency, availability, data durability, capacity and performance.

Most cloud storage architectures incorporate a number of clustered storage nodes that provide high bandwidth access to physical storage backends connected by high speed networks. The architecture consists of multiple storage controller units, each a generic server (CPU, Cache, storage), managing a number of high-performance hard drives. The distributed block storage software creates an abstract single pool of storage by aggregating all of the controller units. Advanced and high-speed networking (data routing) and global load balancing techniques ensure high-performance, high availability storage system.

3.5 Cloud Topology

A telco cloud will typically be deployed in multiple locations ("sites") of varying size and capabilities (HVAC, for example); or looking at this in the context of OpenStack, multiple clouds (i.e. OpenStack end-points) will be deployed that do not rely on each other, by design; each cloud consists of a set of resources isolated from resources of the other clouds. The application layer must span such end-points in order to provide the required service SLA. Irrespective of the nature of the deployment characteristics (e.g., number of racks, number of hosts), the intent of the architecture would be to allow VNFs to be deployed in these sites without major changes.

Some examples of such topologies include:

- Large data centre capable of hosting potentially thousands of servers and the networking to support them
- Intermediate data centre (such as a central office) capable of hosting up to a hundred servers
- Edge (not customer premise) capable of hosting ten to fifty servers

In order to provide the expected availability for any given service, a number of different OpenStack deployment topologies can be considered. This section explores the main options and highlights the characteristics of each. Ultimately the decision rests with the operator to achieve specific availability target taking into account use case, data centre capabilities, economics and risks.

Topology Overview

Availability of any single OpenStack cloud is dependent on a number of factors including:

- environmental dual connected power and PDUs, redundant cooling, rack distribution, etc.
- resilient network fabric ToR (leaf), spine, overlay networking, underlay networking, etc. It is assumed that all network components are designed to be fault tolerant and all OpenStack controllers, computes and storage are dual-homed to alternate leaf switches.
- controller nodes setup in-line with the vendor recommendation (e.g., min 3 physical nodes)
- network nodes (where applicable)
- backend storage nodes setup for highly availability based on quorum (aligned with vendor implementation)
- compute nodes sized to handle the entire workload following local failure scenario

Assumptions and conventions:

- Region is represented by a single OpenStack control plane.
- Resource Failure Domain is effectively the "blast radius" of any major infrastructure failure such as loss of PDU or network leafs.
- Control plane includes redundant network nodes where OVS-kernel is used.
- Controller nodes should be setup for high availability based on quorum (aligned with vendor implementation).

• Shared storage is optional, but it is important to ensure shared assets are distributed across serving clouds such as boot images. Storage needs, per deployment and use cases, can be found in Storage Scenarios and Architecture Fit.

Topol- ogy Ref	Туре	Control Planes	Shared Stor- age (op- tional)	Com- pute AZs	Achiev- able Service Avail- ability %	Service Multi -region aware- ness	Notes
1	Local Redundancy - workload spread across servers	1	1	1	Variable	Not required	Suitable where only limited local applica- tion availability is re- quired e.g. nova anti- affinity
2	Regional Redun- dancy - workload spread across AZs	1	>=2	>=2	>99.n	Not required	Suitable where local application HA is required. Control plane should be distributed across DC failure domains (assuming layer 2 connectivity) but may be unavailable during up grades
3	Global Redun- dancy - workload spread across multiple Regions	>=2	>=2	>=2	>99.nn	Re- quired	Suitable where local and region applica- tion HA is required Control plane could be kept available in one site during up- grades

Table 3.2: Cloud Topology: Redundancy Models

Topology Overview

Topology 1 - Local Redundancy

Under normal operation this deployment can handle a single failure of a controller node or storage node without any impact to the service. If a compute node fails the application layer (often the VNFM) would need to restart workloads on a spare compute node of similar capability i.e., cloud may need to be provided with n+1 capacity. In the case of an active/active application deployed to separate compute nodes (with hypervisor anti-affinity) there would be no service impact.

Important to consider:

- Where possible servers should be distributed and cabled to reduce the impact of any failure e.g., PDU, rack failure. Because each operator has individual site constraints this document will not propose a standard rack layout.
- During maintenance of the control plane, whilst the data (forwarding) plane remains unaffected, the control plane API may not be available and some applications may be relying on it during normal application operation for example for scaling. Additionally if the upgrade involves updating OpenStack services on the compute nodes care needs to be taken. OVS-kernel networking operations may also be impacted during this time.

• During maintenance of storage (e.g., ceph) there is an increased risk of a service-impacting failure, so it is generally recommended to deploy at least one more server than the minimum required for redundancy.

Topology 2 - Regional Redundancy

Under normal operation this topology can handle a single failure of a controller node but provides additional protection to the compute plane and storage. If the application is deployed across 2 or more AZs a major failure impacting the nodes in one AZ can be tolerated assuming the application deployment allows for this. There is a risk with split-brain so a means of deciding application quorum is recommended or by using a third AZ or arbitrator.

Important to consider:

- All those points listed for Topology 1 above.
- When using 3 controller nodes and distributing these physically across the same locations as the computes, if you lose the location with 2 controllers the OpenStack services would be impacted as quorum cannot be gained with a single controller node. It is also possible to use more than 3 controller nodes and co-locate one with each compute AZ allowing lower-risk maintenance but care must be taken to avoid split brain.
- The distributed network fabric must support L2 for the OpenStack control plane VIPs.

Topology 3 - Global Redundancy

Following the example set by public cloud providers who provide Regions and Availability Zones this is effectively a multi-region OpenStack. Assuming the application can make use of this model this provides the highest level of availability but would mean IP level failure controlled outside of OpenStack by global service load balancing (GSLB) i.e., DNS with minimum TTL configured, or client applications that are capable of failing over themselves. This has the added advantage that no resources are shared between different Regions so any fault is isolated to a single cloud and also allows maintenance to take place without service impact.

4 Cloud Infrastructure & VIM Component Level Architecture

4.1 Introduction

Chapter 3 introduced the components of an OpenStack-based IaaS

- Consumable Infrastructure Resources and Services
- Cloud Infrastructure Management Software (VIM: OpenStack) core services and architectural constructs needed to consume and manage the consumable resources
- Underlying physical compute, storage and networking resources

This chapter delves deeper into the capabilities of these different resources and their needed configurations to create and operate an OpenStack-based IaaS cloud. This chapter specifies details on the structure of control and user planes, operating systems, hypervisors and BIOS configurations, and architectural details of underlay and overlay networking, and storage, and the distribution of OpenStack service components among nodes. The chapter also covers implementation support for the Profiles, Profile Extensions & Flavours; the OpenStack flavor types capture both the sizing and the profile configuration (of the host).

4.2 Underlying Resources

Virtualisation

In OpenStack, KVM is configured as the default hypervisor for compute nodes.

- Configuration: OpenStack specifies the steps/instructions to configure KVM:
 - Enable KVM based hardware virtualisation in BIOS. OpenStack provides instructions on how to enable hardware virtualisation for different hardware platforms (x86, Power)
 - * QEMU is similar to KVM in that both are libvirt controlled, have the same feature set and utilise compatible virtual machine images
 - Configure Compute backing storage
 - Specify the CPU Model for KVM guests (VMs)
 - KVM Performance Tweaks
- Hardening the virtualisation layers
 - OpenStack recommends minimizing the code base by removing unused components
 - sVirt (Secure Virtualisation) provides isolation between VM processes, devices, data files and system processes

Compute

Cloud Deployment (Foundation/management) Node

Minimal configuration: 1 node

OpenStack Control Plane Servers (Control Nodes)

• BIOS Requirements

For OpenStack control nodes we use the BIOS parameters for the basic profile defined in Cloud Infrastructure Hardware Profiles features and requirements. Additionally, for OpenStack we need to set the following boot parameters:

BIOS/boot Parameter	Value
Boot disks	RAID 1
CPU reservation for host (kernel)	1 core per NUMA
CPU allocation ratio	2:1

Table 4.1: Boot parameters

- How many nodes to meet SLA
 - Minimum 3 nodes for high availability
- · HW specifications
 - Boot disks are dedicated with Flash technology disks
- Sizing rules
 - It is easy to horizontally scale the number of control nodes

- The number of control nodes is determined by a minimum number needed for high availability (viz., 3 nodes) and the extra nodes needed to handle the transaction volumes, in particular, for Messaging service (e.g., RabbitMQ) and Database (e.g., MySQL) to track state.
- The number of control nodes only needs to be increased in environments with a lot of changes, such as a testing lab, or a very large cloud footprint (rule of thumb: number of control nodes = 3 + quotient(number of compute nodes/1000)).
- The Services Placement Summary table specifies the number of instances that are required based upon the cloud size (number of nodes).

Network nodes

Networks nodes are mainly used for L3 traffic management for overlay tenant network (see more detail in section Neutron).

• BIOS requirements

Table 4.2. BIOS requirements				
BIOS/boot Parameter	Value			
Boot disks	RAID 1			

- Table 4.2: BIOS requirements
- · How many nodes to meet SLA
 - Minimum 2 nodes for high availability using VRRP.
- HW specifications
 - 3 NICs card are needed if we want to isolate the different flows:
 - * 1 NIC for Tenant Network
 - * 1 NIC for External Network
 - * 1 NIC for Other Networks (PXE, Mngt ...)
- Sizing rules
 - Scale out of network node is not easy
 - DVR can be an option for large deployment (see more detail in section Neutron)

Storage nodes

• BIOS requirements

	ruble 1.5. Drob requirements					
ĺ	BIOS/boot Parameter	ter Value				
ĺ	Boot disks	RAID 1				

- Table 4.3: BIOS requirements
- HW specifications: please see Storage
- How many nodes to meet SLA: Active-Passive is the default and recently OpenStack started to support Active Active
- Sizing rules: minimum 2 x 1 TB; recommended 2 x 10 TB

Compute Nodes

This section specifies the compute node configurations to support the Basic and High-Performance profiles; in Open-Stack this would be accomplished by specifying the configurations when creating "flavors". The cloud operator may choose to implement certain profile-extensions (Profile Extensions (specialisations)) as a set of standard configurations, of a given profile, capturing some of the variability through different values or extra specifications.

- The software and hardware configurations are as specified in the Cloud Infrastructure Hardware Profiles features and requirements.
- BIOS requirement
 - The general BIOS requirements are described in the Cloud Infrastructure Hardware Profiles features and requirements.

Example Profiles and their Extensions

The Reference Model specifies the Basic (B) and High-Performance (H) profile types. The Reference Model also provides a choice of network acceleration capabilities utilising, for example, DPDK and SR-IOV technologies. The Table :numref: Profile Extensions and Capabilities (below) lists a few simple examples of profile extensions and some of their capabilities.

Pro-	Description	CPU	SMT	CPU	NUMA	Huge	Data Traf-
file		Allo-		Pinning		pages	fic
Ex-		cation					
ten-		Ratio					
sions							
B1	Basic Profile NoCPU over- sub-	1:1	Y	N	Ν	N	OVS- ker-
	scription profile extension						nel
HV	High Performance Profile	1:1	Y	Y	Y	Y	OVS- ker-
							nel
HD	High Performance Profile with	1:1	Y	Y	Y	Y	OVS-
	DPDK profile extension						DPDK
HS	High Performance Profile with	1:1	Y	Y	Y	Y	SR-IOV
	SR-IOV profile extension						

 Table 4.4: Profile Extensions and Capabilities

BIOS Settings

A number of capabilities need to be enabled in the BIOS (such as NUMA and SMT); the Reference Model section on Cloud Infrastructure Software profile description specifies the capabilities required to be configured. Please note that capabilities may need to be configured in multiple systems. For OpenStack, we also need to set the following boot parameters:

BIOS/boot Parameter	Basic	High Performance
Boot disks	RAID 1	RAID 1

- · How many nodes to meet SLA
 - minimum: two nodes per profile
- HW specifications
 - Boot disks are dedicated with Flash technology disks
- In case of DPDK usage:

Layer	Description		
Cloud infrastructure	Important is placement of NICs to get NUMA-balanced system (balancing the		
	I/O, memory, and storage across both sockets), and configuration of NIC fea-		
	tures. Server BIOS and Host OS kernel command line settings are described in		
	DPDK release notes and DPDK performance reports. Disabling power settings		
	(like Intel Turbo Boost Technology) brings stable performance results, although		
	understanding if and when they benefit workloads and enabling them can achieve		
	better performance results.		
Workload	DPDK uses core affinity along with 1G or 2M huge pages, NUMA settings		
	(to avoid crossing inteconnect between CPUs), and DPDK Poll Mode Drivers		
(PMD, on reserved cores) to get the best performance. DPDK			
	are Long-Term Support maintained stable release with back-ported bug fixes for		
	a two-year period.		

· Sizing rules

Description	Mnemonic
Number of CPU sockets	S
Number of cores	с
SMT	t
RAM	rt
Storage	d
Overcommit	0
Average vCPU per instance	v
Average RAM per instance	ri

Table 4.7: Mnemonic

Table 4.8: Sizing rules

		Basic	High-Performance
# of VMs per node (vCPU)	(s*c*t*o)/v	4*(sct)/v	(s*c*t)/v
# of VMs per node (RAM)	rt/ri	rt/ri	rt/ri
Max # of VMs per node		min(4*(sct)/v,rt/ri)	min((s*c*t)/v,rt/ri)

Caveats:

- These are theoretical limits
- Affinity and anti-affinity rules, among other factors, affect the sizing

Compute Resource Pooling Considerations

- Multiple pools of hardware resources where each resource pool caters for workloads of a specific profile (for example, High-Performance) leads to inefficient use of the hardware as the server resources are configured specifically for a profile. If not properly sized or when demand changes, this can lead to oversupply/starvation scenarios; reconfiguration may not be possible because of the underlying hardware or inability to vacate servers for reconfiguration to support another profile type.
- Single pool of hardware resources including for controllers have the same CPU configuration. This is operationally efficient as any server can be utilised to support any profile or controller. The single pool is valuable with unpredictable workloads or when the demand of certain profiles is insufficient to justify individual hardware selection.

Reservation of Compute Node Cores

The Infrastructure Requirements inf.com.08 requires the allocation of "certain number of host cores/threads to nontenant workloads such as for OpenStack services." A number ("n") of random cores can be reserved for host services (including OpenStack services) by specifying the following in nova.conf:

reserved_host_cpus = n

where n is any positive integer.

If we wish to dedicate specific cores for host processing we need to consider two different usage scenarios:

- 1. Require dedicated cores for Guest resources
- 2. No dedicated cores are required for Guest resources

Scenario #1, results in compute nodes that host both pinned and unpinned workloads. In the OpenStack Wallaby release, scenario #1 is not supported; it may also be something that operators may not allow. Scenario #2 is supported through the specification of the cpu_shared_set configuration. The cores and their sibling threads dedicated to the host services are those that do not exist in the cpu_shared_set configuration.

Let us consider a compute host with 20 cores with SMT enabled (let us disregard NUMA) and the following parameters specified. The physical cores are numbered '0' to '19' while the sibling threads are numbered '20' to '39' where the vCPUs numbered '0' and '20', '1' and '21', etc. are siblings:

 $cpu_shared_set = 1-7,9-19,21-27,29-39$ (can also be specified as $cpu_shared_set = 1-19,\&8,21-39,\&28$)

This implies that the two physical cores '0' and '8' and their sibling threads '20' and '28' are dedicated to the host services, and 19 cores and their sibling threads are available for Guest instances and can be over allocated as per the specified cpu_allocation_ratio in nova.conf.

Pinned and Unpinned CPUs

When a server (viz., an instance) is created the vCPUs are, by default, not assigned to a particular host CPU. Certain workloads require real-time or near real-time behavior viz., uninterrupted access to their cores. For such workloads, CPU pinning allows us to bind an instance's vCPUs to particular host cores or SMT threads. To configure a flavor to use pinned vCPUs, we use a dedicated CPU policy.

openstack flavor set .xlarge -property hw:cpu_policy=dedicated

While an instance with pinned CPUs cannot use CPUs of another pinned instance, this does not apply to unpinned instances; an unpinned instance can utilise the pinned CPUs of another instance. To prevent unpinned instances from disrupting pinned instances, the hosts with CPU pinning enabled are pooled in their own host aggregate and hosts with CPU pinning disabled are pooled in another non-overlapping host aggregate.

Compute node configurations for Profiles and OpenStack Flavors

This section specifies the compute node configurations to support profiles and flavors.

Cloud Infrastructure Hardware Profile

The Cloud Infrastructure Hardware (or simply "host") profile and configuration parameters are utilised in the reference architecture to define different hardware profiles; these are used to configure the BIOS settings on a physical server and configure utility software (such as Operating System and Hypervisor).

An OpenStack flavor defines the characteristics ("capabilities") of a server (viz., VMs or instances) that will be deployed on hosts assigned a host-profile. A many to many relationship exists between flavors and host profiles. Multiple flavors can be defined with overlapping capability specifications with only slight variations that servers of these flavor types can be hosted on similary configured (host profile) compute hosts. Similarly, a server can be specified with a flavor that allows it to be hosted on, say, a host configured as per the Basic profile or a host configured as per the High-Performance profile. Please note that workloads that specify a server flavor so as to be hosted on a host configured as per the High-Performance profile, may not be able to run (adequately with expected performance) on a host configured as per the Basic profile.

A given host can only be assigned a single host profile; a host profile can be assigned to multiple hosts. Host profiles are immutable and hence when a configuration needs to be changed, a new host profile is created.

CPU Allocation Ratio and CPU Pinning

A given host (compute node) can only support a single CPU Allocation Ratio. Thus, to support the B1 and B4 Basic profile extensions (Section 4.2.2.5) with CPU Allocation Ratios of 1.0 and 4.0 we will need to create 2 different host profiles and separate host aggregates for each of the host profiles. The CPU Allocation Ratio is set in the hypervisor on the host.

When the CPU Allocation Ratio exceeds 1.0 then CPU Pinning also needs to be disabled.

Server Configurations

The different networking choices – OVS-Kernel, OVS-DPDK, SR-IOV – result in different NIC port, LAG (Link Aggregation Group), and other configurations. Some of these are shown diagrammatically in section 4.2.9.5.

Leaf and Compute Ports for Server Flavors must align

Compute hosts have varying numbers of Ports/Bonds/LAGs/Trunks/VLANs connected with Leaf ports. Each Leaf port (in A/B pair) must be configured to align with the interfaces required for the compute flavor.

Physical Connections/Cables are generally the same within a zone, regardless of these specific L2/L3/SR-IOV configurations for the compute.

Compute Bond Port: TOR port maps VLANs directly with IRBs on the TOR pair for tunnel packets and Control Plane Control and Storage packets. These packets are then routed on the underlay network GRT.

Server Flavors: B1, B4, HV, HD

Compute SR-IOV Port: TOR port maps VLANs with bridge domains that extend to IRBs, using VXLAN VNI. The TOR port associates each packet's outer VLAN tag with a bridge domain to support VNF interface adjacencies over the local EVPN/MAC bridge domain. This model also applies to direct physical connections with transport elements.

Server Flavors: HS

Notes on SR-IOV

SR-IOV, at the compute server, routes Guest traffic directly with a partitioned NIC card, bypassing the hypervisor and vSwitch software, which provides higher bps/pps throughput for the Guest server. OpenStack and MANO manage SR-IOV configurations for Tenant server interfaces.

- · Server, Linux, and NIC card hardware standards include SR-IOV and VF requirements
- High Performance profile for SR-IOV (hs series) with specific NIC/Leaf port configurations
- OpenStack supports SR-IOV provisioning
- Implement Security Policy, Tap/Mirror, QoS, etc. functions in the NIC, Leaf, and other places

Because SR-IOV involves Guest VLANs between the compute server and the ToR/Leafs, Guest automation and server placement necessarily involves the Leaf switches (e.g., access VLAN outer tag mapping with VXLAN EVPN).

- Local VXLAN tunneling over IP-switched fabric implemented between VTEPs on Leaf switches.
- Leaf configuration controlled by SDN-Fabric/Global Controller.
- Underlay uses VXLAN-enabled switches for EVPN support

SR-IOV-based networking for Tenant Use Cases is required where vSwitch-based networking throughput is inadequate.

Example Host Configurations

Host configurations for B1, B4 Profile Extensions




Figure 4-1: Basic Profile Host Configuration (example and simplified)

Let us refer to the data traffic networking configuration of Figure 4-1 to be part of the hp-B1-a and hp-B4-a host profiles and this requires the configurations as Table 4-3.

Capability	Configured in	Host profile: hp-	Host profile: hp-
		B1-a	B4-a
CPU Allocation Ratio	Hypervisor	1:1	4:1
CPU Pinning	BIOS	Enable	Disable
SMT	BIOS	Enable	Enable
NUMA	BIOS	Disable	Disable
Huge pages	BIOS	No	No
Profile Extensions		B1	B4

Table 4.9: Configuration of Basic Flavor Capabilities

Figure 4-2 shows the networking configuration where the storage and OAM share networking but are independent of the PXE network.




Figure 4-2: Basic Profile Host Configuration with shared Storage and OAM networking (example and simplified)

Let us refer to the above networking set up to be part of the hp-B1-b and hp-B4-b host profiles but the basic configurations as specified in Table 4-3.

In our example, the Profile Extensions B1 and B4, are each mapped to two different host profiles hp-B1-a and hp-B1-b, and hp-B4-a and hp-B4-b respectively. Different network configurations, reservation of CPU cores, Lag values, etc. result in different host profiles.

To ensure Tenant CPU isolation from the host services (Operating System (OS), hypervisor and OpenStack agents), the following needs to be configured:

GRUB Bootloader Parame-	Description	Values
ter		
isolcpus (Applicable only on	A set of cores isolated from the host pro-	isolcpus=1-19, 21-39, 41-59,
Compute Servers)	cesses. Contains vCPUs reserved for Tenants	61-79
	and DPDK	

Table 4.10: GRUB Configuration of Basic Profile with shared Storage

Host configuration for HV Profile Extensions

The above examples of host networking configurations for the B1 and B4 Profile Extensions are also suitable for the HV Profile Extensions; however, the hypervisor and BIOS settings will be different (see table below) and hence there will be a need for different host profiles. Table 4-4 gives examples of three different host profiles; one each for HV, HD and HS Profile Extensions.

Capability	Configured in	Host profile: hp-hv-a	Host profile: hp-hd-a	Host profile: hp-hs-a
Profile Exten-		HV	HD	HS
sions				
CPU Allocation	Hypervisor	1:1	1:1	1:1
Ratio				
NUMA	BIOS, Operating System, Hypervisor and OpenStack Nova Scheduler	Enable	Enable	Enable
CPU Pinning (re- quires NUMA)	OpenStack Nova Scheduler	Enable	Enable	Enable
SMT	BIOS	Enable	Enable	Enable
Huge pages	BIOS	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 4.11: Configuration of High Performance Flavor Capabilities

Host Networking configuration for HD Profile Extensions

An example of the data traffic configuration for the HD (OVS-DPDK) Profile Extensions is shown in Figure 4-3.




Figure 4-3: High Performance Profile Host Configuration with DPDK acceleration (example and simplified)

To ensure Tenant and DPDK CPU isolation from the host services (Operating System (OS), hypervisor and OpenStack agents), the following needs to be configured:

Table 4.12:	GRUB	Configuration	of	High	Performance	Flavor	with
DPDK							

GRUB Bootloader Parame- ter	Description	Values
	A set of cores isolated from the host pro- cesses. Contains vCPUs reserved for Tenants and DPDK	1 · · · · ·

Host Networking configuration for HS Profile Extensions

An example of the data traffic configuration for the HS (SR-IOV) Profile Extensions is shown in Figure 4-4.




Figure 4-4: High Performance Profile Host Configuration with SR-IOV (example and simplified)

To ensure Tenant CPU isolation from the host services (Operating System (OS), hypervisor and OpenStack agents), the following needs to be configured:

Table 4.13: GRUB Configuration of High Performance Flavor with SR-

IOV		
GRUB Bootloader Parame-	Description	Values
ter		
isolcpus (Applicable only on	A set of cores isolated from the host processes.	isolcpus=1-19, 21-39, 41-59,
Compute Servers)	Contains vCPUs reserved for Tenants	61-79

Using Hosts of a Host Profile type

As we have seen Profile Extensions are supported by configuring hosts in accordance with the Profile Extensions specifications. For example, an instance of flavor type B1 can be hosted on a compute node that is configured as an hp-B1-a or hp-B1-b host profile. All compute nodes configured with hp-B1-a or hp-B1-b host profile are made part of a host aggregate, say, ha-B1 and, thus, during server instantiation of B1 flavor hosts from the ha-B1 host aggregate will be selected.

Network Fabric

Networking Fabric consists of:

- Physical switches, routers...
- Switch OS
- Minimum number of switches
- Dimensioning for East/West and North/South
- Spine / Leaf topology east west
- Global Network parameters

- OpenStack control plane VLAN / VXLAN layout
- Provider VLANs

Physical Network Topology

High Level Logical Network Layout




Figure 4-5: Indicative OpenStack Network Layout

N a true al c	Table 4.14: OpenStack Network Chara		
Network	Description	Characteristics	
Provisioning & Management	Initial OS bootstrapping of the servers via PXE, deployment of software and thereafter for access from within the control plane.	Security Domain: ManagementExternally Routable: NoConnected to: All nodes	
Internal API	Intra-OpenStack service API communications, messaging, and database replication	 Security Domain: Management Externally Routable: No Connected to: All nodes except foundation 	
Storage Manage- ment	Backend connectivity between storage nodes for heartbeats, data object replication and synchro- nisation	 Security Domain: Storage Externally Routable: No Connected to: All nodes except foundation 	
Storage Front-end	Block/Object storage access via cinder/swift	 Security Domain: Storage Externally Routable: No Connected to: All nodes except foundation 	
Tenant	VXLAN/Geneve project overlay networks (OVS kernel mode) – i.e., RFC1918 re-usable private networks as controlled by cloud administrator	 Security Domain: Underlay Externally Routable: No Connected to: controllers and computes 	
External API	Hosts the public OpenStack API endpoints in- cluding the dashboard (Horizon)	 Security Domain: Public Externally routable: Yes Connected to: controllers 	
External Provider (FIP)	Network with a pool of externally routable IP ad- dresses used by neutron routers to NAT to/from the tenant RFC1918 private networks	 Security Domain: Data Centre Externally routable: Yes Connected to: controllers, OVS computes 	
External Provider (VLAN)	External Data Centre L2 networks (VLANs) the Note: External IP address management is required	 at are directlyaDressible DathEproject. Externally routable: Yes Connected to: OVS DPDK computes 	
IPMI / Out of Band	The remote "lights-out" management port of the servers e.g., iLO, IDRAC / IPMI / Redfish	 Security Domain: Management Externally routable: No Connected to: IPMI port on all servers 	

Table 4.14: OpenStack Network Characteristics

A VNF application network topology is expressed in terms of servers, vNIC interfaces with vNet access networks,

and WAN Networks while the VNF Application Servers require multiple vNICs, VLANs, and host routes configured within the server's Kernel.

Octavia v2 API conformant Load Balancing

Load balancing is needed for automatic scaling, managing availability and changes. Octavia is an open-source load balancer for OpenStack, based on HAProxy, and replaces the deprecated (as of OpenStack Queens release) Neutron LBaaS. The Octavia v2 API is a superset of the deprecated Neutron LBaaS v2 API and has a similar CLI for seamless transition.

As a default Octavia utilises Amphorae Load Balancer. Amphorae consists of a fleet of servers (VMs, containers or bare metal servers) and delivers horizontal scaling by managing and spinning these resources on demand. The reference implementation of the Amphorae image is an Ubuntu virtual machine running HAProxy.

Octavia depends upon a number of OpenStack services including Nova for spinning up compute resources on demand and their life cycle management; Neutron for connectivity between the compute resources, project environment and external networks; Keystone for authentication; and Glance for storing of the compute resource images.

Octavia supports provider drivers which allows third-party load balancing drivers (such as F5, AVI, etc.) to be utilised instead of the default Amphorae load balancer. When creating a third-party load balancer, the **provider** attribute is used to specify the backend to be used to create the load balancer. The **list providers** lists all enabled provider drivers. Instead of using the provider parameter, an alternate is to specify the flavor_id in the create call where provider-specific Octavia flavors have been created.

Neutron Extensions

OpenStack Neutron is an extensible framework that allows incorporation through plugins and API Extensions. API Extensions provide a method for introducing new functionality and vendor specific capabilities. Neutron plugins support new or vendor-specific functionality. Extensions also allow specifying new resources or extensions to existing resources and the actions on these resources. Plugins implement these resources and actions.

This Reference Architecture supports the ML2 plugin (see below) as well as the service plugins including for LBaaS (Load Balancer as a Service), and VPNaaS (VPN as a Service). The OpenStack wiki provides a list of Neutron plugins.

Every Neutron plugin needs to implement a minimum set of common methods (actions for Wallaby release). Resources can inherit Standard Attributes and thereby have the extensions for these standard attributes automatically incorporated. Additions to resources, such as additional attributes, must be accompanied by an extension.

Interfaces and APIs of this Reference Architecture provides a list of Neutron Extensions. The current available extensions can be obtained using the List Extensions API and details about an extension using the Show extension details API.

Neutron ML2 integration The OpenStack Modular Layer 2 (ML2) plugin simplifies adding networking technologies by utilising drivers that implement these network types and methods for accessing them. Each network type is managed by an ML2 type driver and the mechanism driver exposes interfaces to support the actions that can be performed on the network type resources. The OpenStack ML2 documentation lists example mechanism drivers.

Network quality of service

For VNF workloads, the resource bottlenecks are not only the CPU and the memory but also the I/O bandwidth and the forwarding capacity of virtual and non-virtual switches and routers within the infrastructure. Several techniques (all complementary) can be used to improve QoS and try to avoid any issue due to a network bottleneck (mentioned per order of importance):

- Nodes interfaces segmentation: Have separated NIC ports for Storage and Tenant networks. Actually, the storage traffic is bursty, and especially in case of service restoration after some failure or new service implementation, upgrades, etc. Control and management networks should rely on a separate interface from the interface used to handle tenant networks.
- Capacity planning: FW, physical links, switches, routers, NIC interfaces and DCGW dimensioning (+ load monitoring: each link within a LAG or a bond shouldn't be loaded over 50% of its maximum capacity to guaranty service continuity in case of individual failure).
- Hardware choice: e.g., ToR/fabric switches, DCGW and NIC cards should have appropriate buffering and queuing capacity.
- High Performance compute node tuning (including OVS-DPDK).

Integration Interfaces

• DHCP:

When the Neutron-DHCP agent is hosted in controller nodes, then for the servers, on a Tenant network, that need to acquire an IPv4 and/or IPv6 address, the VLAN for the Tenant must be extended to the control plane servers so that the Neutron agent can receive the DHCP requests from the server and send the response to the server with the IPv4 and/or IPv6 addresses and the lease time. Please see OpenStack provider Network.

- DNS
- LDAP
- IPAM

Storage Backend

Storage systems are available from multiple vendors and can also utilise commodity hardware from any number of opensource based storage packages (such as LVM, Ceph, NFS, etc.). The proprietary and open-source storage systems are supported in Cinder through specific plugin drivers. The OpenStack Cinder documentation specifies the minimum functionality that all storage drivers must support. The functions include:

- Volume: create, delete, attach, detach, extend, clone (volume from volume), migrate
- Snapshot: create, delete and create volume from snapshot
- Image: create from volume

The document also includes a matrix for a number of proprietary drivers and some of the optional functions that these drivers support. This matrix is a handy tool to select storage backends that have the optional storage functions needed by the cloud operator. The cloud workload storage requirements helps determine the backends that should be deployed by the cloud operator. The common storage backend attachment methods include iSCSI, NFS, local disk, etc. and the matrix lists the supported methods for each of the vendor drivers. The OpenStack Cinder Available Drivers documentation provides a list of all OpenStack compatible drivers and their configuration options.

The Cinder Configuration document provides information on how to configure Cinder including Anuket required capabilities for volume encryption, Policy configuration, quotas, etc. The Cinder Administration document provides information on the capabilities required by Anuket including managing volumes, snapshots, multi-storage backends, migrate volumes, etc.

Ceph is the default Anuket Reference Architecture storage backend and is discussed below.

Ceph Storage Cluster

The Ceph storage cluster is deployed on bare metal hardware. The minimal configuration is a cluster of three bare metal servers to ensure High availability. The Ceph Storage cluster consists of the following components:

- CEPH-MON (Ceph Monitor)
- OSD (object storage daemon)
- RadosGW (Rados Gateway)
- Journal
- Manager

Ceph monitors maintain a master copy of the maps of the cluster state required by Ceph daemons to coordinate with each other. Ceph OSD handles the data storage (read/write data on the physical disks), data replication, recovery, rebalancing, and provides some monitoring information to Ceph Monitors. The RadosGW provides Object Storage RESTful gateway with a Swift-compatible API for Object Storage.




Figure 4-6: Ceph Storage System

BIOS Requirement for Ceph servers

Table 4.15: BIOS Requirement for Ceph servers

BIOS/boot Parameter	Value
Boot disks	RAID 1

How many nodes to meet SLA :

• minimum: three bare metal servers where Monitors are collocated with OSD. Note: at least 3 Monitors and 3 OSDs are required for High Availability.

HW specifications :

- Boot disks are dedicated with Flash technology disks
- For an IOPS oriented cluster (Flash technology), the journal can be hosted on OSD disks
- For a capacity-oriented cluster (HDD), the journal must be hosted on dedicated Flash technology disks

Sizing rules :

- Minimum of 6 disks per server
- Replication factor : 3
- 1 Core-GHz per OSD
- 16GB RAM baseline + 2-3 GB per OSD

4.3 Virtualised Infrastructure Manager (VIM)

This section covers:

- Detailed breakdown of OpenStack core services
- Specific build-time parameters

VIM Services

A high-level overview of the core OpenStack Services was provided in Cloud Infrastructure Architecture - OpenStack. In this section we describe the core and other needed services in more detail.

Keystone

Keystone is the authentication service, the foundation of identity management in OpenStack. Keystone needs to be the first deployed service. Keystone has services running on the control nodes and no services running on the compute nodes:

- Keystone admin API
- Keystone public API in Keystone V3 this is the same as the admin API

Glance

Glance is the image management service. Glance has only a dependency on the Keystone service therefore it is the second one deployed. Glance has services running on the control nodes and no services running on the compute nodes:

- Glance API
- · Glance Registry

The Glance backends include Swift, Ceph RBD and NFS.

Cinder

Cinder is the block device management service, depends on Keystone and possibly Glance to be able to create volumes from images. Cinder has services running on the control nodes and no services running on the compute nodes: - Cinder API - Cinder Scheduler - Cinder Volume – the Cinder volume process needs to talk to its backends

The Cinder backends include SAN/NAS storage, iSCSI drives, Ceph RBD and NFS.

Swift

Swift is the object storage management service, Swift depends on Keystone and possibly Glance to be able to create volumes from images. Swift has services running on the control nodes and the compute nodes:

- Proxy Services
- Object Services
- Container Services
- Account Services

The Swift backends include iSCSI drives, Ceph RBD and NFS.

Neutron

Neutron is the networking service, depends on Keystone and has services running on the control nodes and the compute nodes. Depending upon the workloads to be hosted by the Infrastructure, and the expected load on the controller node, some of the Neutron services can run on separate network node(s). Factors affecting controller node load include number of compute nodes and the number of API calls being served for the various OpenStack services (nova, neutron, cinder, glance etc.). To reduce controller node load, network nodes are widely added to manage L3 traffic for overlay tenant networks and interconnection with external networks. The Table below lists the networking service components and their placement. Please note that while network nodes are listed in the table below, network nodes only deal with tenant networks and not provider networks. Also, network nodes are not required when SDN is utilised for networking.

	Table 4.10. Incution Servic	es i lacement	
Networking Ser-	Description	Required or Op-	Placement
vice component		tional Service	
neutron server	Manages user requests and exposes the	Required	Controller node
(neutron-server	Neutron APIs		
and neutron-*-			
plugin)			
DHCP agent	Provides DHCP services to tenant net-	Optional depend-	Network node (Controller
(neutron-dhcp-	works and is responsible for maintain-	ing upon plug-in	node if no network node
agent)	ing DHCP configuration. For High avail-		present)
	ability, multiple DHCP agents can be as-		
	signed.		
L3 agent (neutron-	Provides L3/NAT forwarding for exter-	Optional depend-	Network node (Controller
13-agent)	nal network access of servers on tenant	ing upon plug-in	node if no network node
	networks and supports services such as		present) NB in DVR based
	Firewall-as-a-service (FWaaS) and Load		OpenStack Networking,
	Balancer-as-a-service (LBaaS)		also in all Compute nodes.
neutron metadata	The metadata service provides a way	Optional	Network node (Controller
agent (neutron-	for instances to retrieve instance-specific		node if no network node
metadata-agent)	data. The networking service, neutron,		present)
	is responsible for intercepting these re-		
	quests and adding HTTP headers which		
	uniquely identify the source of the request		
	before forwarding it to the metadata API		
	server. These functions are performed by		
	the neutron metadata agent.		
neutron plugin	Runs on each compute node to con-	Required	Every Compute Node
agent (neutron-*-	trol and manage the local virtual net-		
agent)	work driver (such as the Open vSwitch		
	or Linux Bridge) configuration and lo-		
	cal networking configuration for servers		
	hosted on that node.		
			-

Table 4.16: Neutron Services Placement

Issues with the standard networking (centralised routing) approach

The network node performs both routing and NAT functions and represents both a scaling bottleneck and a single point of failure.

Consider two servers on different compute nodes and using different project networks (a.k.a. tenant networks) where the both of the project networks are connected by a project router. For communication between the two servers (instances with a fixed or floating IP address), the network node routes East-West network traffic among project networks using the same project router. Even though the instances are connected by a router, all routed traffic must flow through the network node, and this becomes a bottleneck for the whole network.

While the separation of the routing function from the controller node to the network node provides a degree of scaling it is not a truly scalable solution. We can either add additional cores/compute-power or network node to the network node cluster, but, eventually, it runs out of processing power especially with high throughput requirement. Therefore, for scaled deployments, there are multiple options including use of Dynamic Virtual Routing (DVR) and Software Defined Networking (SDN).

Distributed Virtual Routing (DVR)

With DVR, each compute node also hosts the L3-agent (providing the distributed router capability) and this then allows direct instance to instance (East-West) communications.

The OpenStack "High Availability Using Distributed Virtual Routing (DVR)" provides an in-depth view into how DVR works and the traffic flow between the various nodes and interfaces for three different use cases. Please note that DVR was introduced in the OpenStack Juno release and, thus, its detailed analysis in the Liberty release documentation is not out of character for OpenStack documentation.

DVR addresses both scalability and high availability for some L3 functions but is not fully fault tolerant. For example, North/South SNAT traffic is vulnerable to single node (network node) failures. DVR with VRRP addresses this vulnerability.

Software Defined Networking (SDN)

For the most reliable solution that addresses all the above issues and Telco workload requirements requires SDN to offload Neutron calls.

SDN provides a truly scalable and preferred solution to suport dynamic, very large-scale, high-density, telco cloud environments. OpenStack Neutron, with its plugin architecture, provides the ability to integrate SDN controllers (Virtual Networking – 3rd party SDN solution). With SDN incorporated in OpenStack, changes to the network is triggered by workloads (and users), translated into Neutron APIs and then handled through neutron plugins by the corresponding SDN agents.

Nova

Nova is the compute management service, depends on all above components and is deployed after their deployment. Nova has services running on the control nodes and the compute nodes:

- nova-metadata-api
- nova-compute api
- nova-consoleauth
- · nova-scheduler
- nova-conductor
- nova-novncproxy
- nova-compute-agent which runs on Compute node

Please note that the Placement-API must have been installed and configured prior to nova compute starts.

Ironic

Ironic is the bare metal provisioning service. Ironic depends on all above components and is deployed after them. Ironic has services running on the control nodes and the compute nodes:

- Ironic API
- · ironic-conductor which executes operation on bare metal nodes

Note: This is an optional service. The Ironic APIs are still under development.

Heat

Heat is the orchestration service using templates to provision cloud resources, Heat integrates with all OpenStack services. Heat has services running on the control nodes and no services running on the compute nodes:

- heat-api
- heat-cfn-api
- heat-engine

Horizon

Horizon is the Web User Interface to all OpenStack services. Horizon has services running on the control nodes and no services running on the compute nodes.

Placement

The OpenStack Placement service enables tracking (or accounting) and scheduling of resources. It provides a RESTful API and a data model for the managing of resource provider inventories and usage for different classes of resources. In addition to standard resource classes, such as vCPU, MEMORY_MB and DISK_GB, the Placement service supports custom resource classes (prefixed with "CUSTOM_") provided by some external resource pools such as a shared storage pool provided by, say, Ceph. The placement service is primarily utilised by nova-compute and nova-scheduler. Other OpenStack services such as Neutron or Cyborg can also utilise placement and do so by creating Provider Trees. The following data objects are utilised in the placement service:

- Resource Providers provide consumable inventory of one or more classes of resources (CPU, memory or disk). A resource provider can be a compute host, for example.
- Resource Classes specify the type of resources (vCPU, MEMORY_MB and DISK_GB or CUSTOM_*)
- Inventory: Each resource provider maintains the total and reserved quantity of one or more classes of resources. For example, RP_1 has available inventory of 16 vCPU, 16384 MEMORY_MB and 1024 DISK_GB.
- Traits are qualitative characteristics of the resources from a resource provider. For example, the trait for RPA_1 "is_SSD" to indicate that the DISK_GB provided by RP_1 are solid state drives.
- Allocations represent resources that have been assigned/used by some consumer of that resource.
- Allocation candidates is the collection of resource providers that can satisfy an allocation request.

The Placement API is stateless and, thus, resiliency, availability and scaling, it is possible to deploy as many servers as needed. On start, the nova-compute service will attempt to make a connection to the Placement API and keep attempting to connect to the Placement API, logging and warning periodically until successful. Thus, the Placement API must be installed and enabled prior to Nova compute.

Placement has services running on the control node: - nova-placement-api

Barbican

Barbican is the OpenStack Key Manager service. It is an optional service hosted on controller nodes. It provides secure storage, provisioning, and management of secrets as passwords, encryption keys and X.509 Certificates. Barbican API is used to centrally manage secrets used by OpenStack services, e.g., symmetric encryption keys used for Block storage encryption or Object Storage encryption or asymmetric keys and certificates used for Glance image signing and verification.

Barbican usage provides a means to fulfill security requirements such as sec.sys.012 "The Platform **must** protect all secrets by using strong encryption techniques and storing the protected secrets externally from the component" and sec.ci.001 "The Platform **must** support Confidentiality and Integrity of data at rest and in transit.".

Cyborg

Cyborg is the OpenStack project for the general purpose management framework for accelerators (including GPUs, FPGAs, ASIC-based devices, etc.), and their lifecycle management.

Cyborg will support only a subset of the Nova operations; the set of Nova operations supported in Cyborg depends upon the merge of a set of Nova patches in Cyborg. In Wallaby, not all the required Nova patches have been merged. The list of Cyborg operations with Nova dependencies supported in Wallaby is listed here; the Nova operations supported in Cyborg at any given time is also available.

Cyborg supports:

- Acceleration Resource Discovery
- Accelerator Life Cycle Management

Accelerators can be of type:

- Software: dpdk/spdk, pmem, ...
- Hardware (device types): FPGA, GPU, ARM SoC, NVMe SSD, CCIX based Caches, ...


The Cyborg architecture consists of the cyborg-api, cyborg-conductor, cyborg-db, cyborg-agent, and generic device type drivers. cyborg-api, cyborg-conductor and cyborg-db are hosted on control nodes. cyborg-agent, which runs on compute nodes, interacts with generic device type drivers on those nodes. These generic device type drivers are an abstraction of the vendor specific drivers; there is a generic device type driver for each device type (see above for list of some of the device types). The current list of the supported vendor drivers is listed under "Driver Support".


Containerised OpenStack Services

Containers are lightweight compared to Virtual Machines and leads to efficient resource utilisation. Kubernetes auto manages scaling, recovery from failures, etc. Thus, it is recommended that the OpenStack services be containerised for resiliency and resource efficiency.

In Chapter 3, Figure 3.2 shows a high level Virtualised OpenStack services topology. The containerised OpenStack services topology version is shown in Figure 4-7.

Figure 4-7: Containerised OpenStack Services Topology





4.4 Consumable Infrastructure Resources and Services

Support for Cloud Infrastructure Profiles and flavors

Reference Model Chapter 4 and 5 provide information about the Cloud Infrastructure Profiles and their size information. OpenStack flavors with their set of properties describe the server capabilities and size required to determine the compute host which will run this server. The set of properties must match compute profiles available in the infrastructure. To implement these profiles and sizes, it is required to set up the flavors as specified in the tables below.

		Table 4.17: Neutron Servic	
Flavor Ca-	Reference RM	Basic	High-Performance
pabilities	Chapter 4 and 5		
CPU allo-	infra.com.cfg.001	In flavor create or flavor	In flavor create or flavor set -property
cation ratio		set -property cpu_all oca-	cpu_allocation_ratio=1.0
(custom ex-		tion_ratio=4.0	
tra_specs)			
NUMA Awareness	infra.com.cfg.002		 In flavor create or flavor set specify –property hw:numa_nodes=<integer #numa_nodes="" 0="" 1="" of="" range="" to="" –="">.</integer> To restrict an instance's vCPUs to a single host NUMA node, specify: –property hw:numa_nodes=1. Some compute intensive* workloads with highly sensitive memory latency or bandwidth requirements, the instance may benefit from spreading across multiple NUMA nodes: –property
CPU Pinning	infra.com.cfg.003	In flavor create or fla- vor set specify –property hw: cpu_policy=shared (default)	 hw:numa_nodes=2 In flavor create or flavor set specify –property hw:cpu_policy=dedicated and –property hw:cpu_thread_policy=<prefer, isolate="" require,="">.</prefer,> Use "isolate" thread policy for very high compute intensive workloads that require that each vCPU be placed on a different physical core
Huge pages	infra.com.cfg.004		-property hw:mem_page_size= <small size="" ="" large=""></small>
SMT	infra.com.cfg.005		In flavor create or flavor set specify –property hw:cpu_threads= <integer#threads (usually="" 1="" or<br="">2)></integer#threads>
OVS-	in-		ml2.conf.ini configured to support [OVS] data-
DPDK	fra.net.acc.cfg.001		path_type=netdev Note: huge pages should be
	-		configured to large
Local Stor-	in-	trait:STORAGEDISK SSD	=teajuiseORAGE_DISK_SSD=required
age SSD	fra.hw.stg.ssd.cfg.00		
Port speed	in- fra.hw.nic.cfg.002	-property quota	-property quota vif_inboundaverage=3125000 720hd vif_outbound_average=3125000 Note: 25 Gbps = 3125000 kilobytes per second 0720.

Table 4.17: Neutron Services Placement

• To configure profile-extensions, for example, the "Storage Intensive High Performance" profile, as defined in Profile Extensions (specialisations), in addition to the above, need to configure the storage IOPS: the following two parameters need to be specified in the flavor create: -property quota:disk_write_iops_sec=<IOPS#> and -property quota:disk_read_iops_sec=<IOPS#>.

The flavor create command and the mandatory and optional configuration parameters is documented in https://docs.

openstack.org/nova/latest/user/flavors.html.

Logical segregation and high availability

To ensure logical segregation and high availability, the architecture will rely on the following principles:

- Availability zone: provide resiliency and fault tolerance for VNF deployments, by means of physical hosting distribution of compute nodes in separate racks with separate power supply, in the same or different DC room
- Affinity-groups: allow tenants to make sure that VNFC instances are on the same compute node or are on different compute nodes.

Note: The Cloud Infrastructure doesn't provide any resiliency mechanisms at the service level. Any server restart shall be triggered by the VNF Manager instead of OpenStack:

- It doesn't implement Instance High Availability which could allow OpenStack Platform to automatically re-spawn instances on a different compute node when their host compute node breaks.
- Physical host reboot does not trigger automatic server recovery.
- Physical host reboot does not trigger the automatic start of a server.

Limitations and constraints

• NUMA Overhead: isolated core will be used for overhead tasks from the hypervisor.

Transaction Volume Considerations

Storage transaction volumes impose a requirement on North-South network traffic in and out of the storage backend. Data availability requires that the data be replicated on multiple storage nodes and each new write imposes East-West network traffic requirements.

4.5 Cloud Topology and Control Plane Scenarios

Typically, Clouds have been implemented in large (central) data centres with hundreds to tens of thousands of servers. Telco Operators have also been creating intermediate data centres in central office locations, colocation centres, and now edge centres at the physical edge of their networks because of the demand for low latency and high throughput for 5G, IoT and connected devices (including autonomous driverless vehicles and connected vehicles). Chapter 3.5 of this document, discusses Cloud Topology and lists 3 types of data centres: Large, Intermediate and Edge.

For ease of convenience, unless specifically required, in this section we will use Central Cloud Centre, Edge Cloud Centre and Intermediate Cloud Centre as representative terms for cloud services hosted at centralised large data centres, Telco edge locations and for locations with capacity somewhere in between the large data centres and edge locations, respectively. The mapping of various terms, including the Reference Model terminology specified in Table 8-5 :ref: 'ref_model/chapter08:comparison of deployment topologies and edge terms and Open Glossary of Edge Computing is as follows:

- Central Cloud Centre: Large Centralised Data Centre, Regional Data Centre
- Intermediate Cloud Centre: Metro Data Centre, Regional Edge, Aggregation Edge
- Edge Cloud Centre: Edge, Mini-/Micro-Edge, Micro Modular Data Centre, Service Provider Edge, Access Edge, Aggregation Edge

In the Intermediate and Edge cloud centres, there may be limitations on the resource capacity, as in the number of servers, and the capacity of these servers in terms of # of cores, RAM, etc. restricting the set of services that can be deployed and, thus, creating a dependency between other data centres. In Telco Edge Cloud, Table 8-5 specifies the physical and environmental characteristics, infrastructure capabilities and deployment scenarios of different locations.

OpenStack Services Topology of this document, specifies the differences between the Control Plane and Data Plane, and specifies which of the control nodes, compute nodes, storage nodes (optional) and network nodes (optional) are components of these planes. The previous sections of this Chapter 4 include a description of the OpenStack services and their deployment in control nodes, compute nodes, and optionally storage nodes and network nodes (rarely). The Control Plane deployment scenarios determine the distribution of OpenStack and other needed services among the different node types. This section considers the Centralised Control Plane (CCP) and Distributed Control Plane (DCP) scenarios. The choice of control plane and the cloud centre resource capacity and capabilities determine the deployment of OpenStack services in the different node types.

The Central Cloud Centres are organised around a Centralised Control Plane. With the introduction of Intermediate and Edge Cloud Centres, the Distributed Control Plane deployment becomes a possibility. A number of independent control planes (sometimes referred to as Local Control Planes (LCP)) exist in the Distributed Control Plane scenario, compared with a single control plane in the Centralised Control Plane scenario. Thus, in addition to the control plane and controller services deployed at the Central Cloud Centre, Local Control Planes hosting a full-set or subset of the controller services are also deployed on the Intermediate and Edge Cloud Centres. Table 4-5 presents examples of such deployment choices.

Table 4.18: Distribution of OpenStack services on different not	les de-
pending upon Control Plane Scenario	

Control Plane	Deployed in	Orches- tration	Identity	Image	Compute	Network	Storage
			Manage- ment	Manage- ment		Manage- ment	Manage- ment
ССР	Centralised DC – control nodes	heat-api, heat- engine, nova- placement- api	Identity Provider (IdP), Keystone API	Glance API, Glance Registry	nova- compute api, nova- scheduler, nova- conductor	neutron- server, neutron- dhcp- agent, neutron- L2-agent, neutron- L3-agent (optional), neutron- metadata -agent	Cinder API, Cinder Scheduler, Cinder Volume
DCP: com- bination of services depend- ing upon Center size	Any DC - Control nodes Option 1	heat-api, heat- engine, nova- placement- api	Identity Provider (IdP), Keystone API	Glance API, Glance Registry	nova- compute api, nova- scheduler, nova- conductor	neutron- server, neutron- dhcp- agent, neutron- L2-agent, neutron- L3-agent (optional), neutron- metadata -agent	Cinder API, Cinder Scheduler, Cinder Volume
	Any DC - Control nodes Op- tion 2: split services between two or more DCs	in one of the DC	in the Large DC	in the Large DC	in one of the DC	in one of ther DC	in one of the DC
CCP or DCP	Compute nodes				nova- compute -agent	neutron- L2- agent, neutron- L3-agent (optional)	
ССР	Compute nodes	nova- placement- api			nova- compute- agent, nova- conductor	neutron -server, neutron- dhcp- agent, neutron- L2-agent, neutron- L3-agent (optional)	

Edge Cloud Topology

The Reference Model Chapter Telco Edge Cloud, presents the deployment environment characteristics, infrastructure characteristics and new values for the Infrastructure Profiles at the Edge.

The Edge computing whitepaper includes information such as the services that run on various nodes. The information from the whitepaper coupled with that from the OpenStack Reference Architecture for 100, 300 and 500 nodes will help in deciding which OpenStack and other services (such as database, messaging) run on which nodes in what Cloud Centre and the number of copies that should be deployed. These references also present the pros and cons of DCP and CCP and designs to address some of the challenges of each of the models.

Table 8-4 in the Reference Model Telco Edge Cloud: Platform Services Deployment lists the Platform Services that may be placed in the different node types (control, compute and storage). Depending upon the capacity and resources available only the compute nodes may exist at the Edge thereby impacting operations.

Table 8-3 in the Reference Model Chapter Telco Edge Cloud: Infrastructure Profiles lists a number of Infrastructure Profile characteristics and the changes that may need to be made for certain Edge clouds depending upon their resource capabilities. It should be noted that none of these changes affect the definition of OpenStack flavors.

The previous section listed the OpenStack services deployed on the controller nodes depending upon the control plane distribution. As specified earlier in this chapter, at least 3 controller nodes should be deployed for HA. Compute nodes may also exist at the sites where controller nodes are deployed.

Control plane services are not hosted at edge sites. Each edge site can be treated as its own OpenStack AZ. The compute nodes, will host *nova-compute*, a component of the the Compute Service (Nova), and *neutron-L2-agent*, a component of the Network Service (Neutron).

The Edge sites may or may not contain local storage. If the edge sites contain storage, then the Block Storage service (Cinder) is usually deployed to run in an active/active mode with the centrally deployed Block Storage service. Instance images are downloaded and stored locally; they can be downloaded even prior to use.

If the edge site doesn't contain storage then the images would need to be cached from the central site. Two ptions exist:

- The instance images would be downloaded and cached in the Nova cache on first use; they will then be available for subsequent use.
- Pre-caching the instance images for low time-to-boot latency. This has been supported in Nova since the Open-Stack Ussuri release.

Image caching and considerations for its use are discussed in the OpenStack document Image Caching.

Edge Cloud Deployment Tools

Deployment at the Edge requires support for large scale deployment. A number of open-source tools are available for the purpose including:

- Airship: declaratively configure, deploy and maintain an integrated virtualisation and containerisation platform
- Starling-X: cloud infrastructure software stack for the edge
- Triple-O: for installing, upgrading and operating OpenStack clouds

These installers are described in more details in Operations and Life Cycle Management.

5 Interfaces and APIs

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a consolidated set of OpenStack Service APIs corresponding to the ETSI NFV Nf-Vi, Vi-Vnfm and Or-Vi interfaces. The OpenStack Wallaby version is used as the baseline for these APIs and CLIs in this Reference Architecture (RA-1) version. Any Cloud Infrastructure + VIM reference implementations that **get certified by RC** can be considered as Anuket RA Conformant.

The Chapter presents the APIs for the core OpenStack services defined in Chapter 3 and a consolidated view of these and other APIs that are of interest.

OpenStack is a multi-project framework composed of independently evolving services. It is not enough to rely only on the OpenStack release to characterise the capabilities supported by these services. Regarding OpenStack services APIs, an "API version" is associated with each OpenStack service. In addition to major API versions, some OpenStack services (Nova, Glance, Keystone, Cinder...) support microversions. The microversions allow new features to be introduced over time. In this chapter, the **major version** and **microversion** are specified per service. The specified microversion is the minimal microversion that supports the features requested for this RA. For the purpose of conformance tests, this chapter also identifies the set of features, offered by a service, that are mandatory for Anuket compliant implementation.

5.2 Core OpenStack Services APIs

Please note that OpenStack provides a maximum microversion to be used with an OpenStack release. In the following sections the "Maximal API Version" refers to this maximum microversion specified for the OpenStack Wallaby release. Please note that in Reference Conformance (RC-1) testing, the System Under Test (SUT) can utilise newer microversions because of the OpenStack microversion policies. As per multiple OpenStack services documentation, for example the Compute Service, "A cloud that is upgraded to support newer microversions will still support all older microversions to maintain the backward compatibility for those users who depend on older microversions."

Keystone

Table 5.1: Keystone			
OpenStack Service API Version Maximal API Microversion			
Identity: Keystone	v3	3.14	

Keystone Features	Mandatory
access_rules	
application_credentials	X
external_idp	
federation	
oauth1	
project_tags	X
security_compliance	Х
trust	Х

Table 5.2:	Keystone Features
------------	--------------------------

Identity API v3: https://docs.openstack.org/api-ref/identity/v3/index.html

Identity API v3 extensions: https://docs.openstack.org/api-ref/identity/v3-ext/

Security compliance and PCI-DSS: https://docs.openstack.org/keystone/train/admin/configuration.html# security-compliance-and-pci-dss

Glance

Table 5.3: Glance				
OpenStack Service API Version Maximal API Microversion				
Image: Glance	v2	2.9		

Glance Features	Mandatory
import_image	
os_glance_reserved	
web-download import	

Image Service Versions: https://docs.openstack.org/api-ref/image/versions/index.html#version-history

Cinder

Table 5.5: Cinder				
OpenStack Service API Version Maximal API Microversion				
Block Storage: Cinder	v3	3.64		

Cinder Features	Mandatory
backup	X
clone	X
consistency_group	
extend_attached_volume	
extend_attached_encrypted_volume	
manage_snapshot	X
manage_volume	X
multi_backend	
snapshot	Х
volume_revert	X

Block Storage API: https://docs.openstack.org/api-ref/block-storage/

REST API Version History: https://docs.openstack.org/cinder/latest/contributor/api_microversion_history.html

Swift

Table 5.7: Swift		
OpenStack Service	API Version	
Object Storage: Swift	v1	

Table 5.8: Swift Features

Swift Features	Mandatory
account_quotas	X
bulk_delete	X
bulk_upload	X
container_quotas	X
container_sync	
crossdomain	X
discoverability	X
form_post	X
ratelimit	X
s3api	
slo	X
staticweb	X
symlink	Х
temp_url	Х
tempauth	X
versioned_writes	Х

Object Storage API: https://docs.openstack.org/api-ref/object-store/index.html Discoverability: https://docs.openstack.org/swift/latest/api/discoverability.html

Neutron

OpenStack Service	API Version
Networking: Neutron	v2.0

Neutron Extensions	Mandatory
address-scope	X
agent	X
allowed-address-pairs	X
auto-allocated-topology	X
availability_zone	X
availability_zone_filter	X
binding	X
binding-extended	X
default-subnetpools	X
dhcp_agent_scheduler	

Table 5.10: Neutron Extensions

continues on next page

Table 5.10 – continued from	
Neutron Extensions	Mandatory
dns-domain-ports	
dns-integration	
dvr	
empty-string-filtering	X
ext-gw-mode	X
external-net	X
extra_dhcp_opt	X
extraroute	X
extraroute-atomic	
flavors	X
filter-validation	
fip-port-details	
floating-ip-port-forwarding	
floatingip-pools	
ip-substring-filtering	X
13_agent_scheduler	
13-flavors	
13-ha	
logging	
metering	
multi-provider	X
net-mtu	X
net-mtu-writable	X
network_availability_zone	X
network-ip-availability	X
network-segment-range	
pagination	X
port-mac-address-regenerate	
port-resource-request	
port-security	X
port-security-groups-filtering	X
project-id	X
provider	X
rbac-policies	X
router	X
router_availability_zone	X
_ •_	X
qos qos-bw-limit-direction	X
-	X X
qos-bw-minimum-ingress	X X
qos-default	
qos-fip	X
qos-gateway-ip	X
qos-rule-type-details	X
qos-rules-alias	X
quotas	X
quota_details	X
revision-if-match	X
rbac-address-scope	
rbac-security-groups	on next nage

Table	5.10 –	continued	previous page
	-		

continues on next page

Neutron Extensions	Mandatory
rbac-subnetpool	
router-interface-fip	
security-group	X
service-type	X
sorting	X
standard-attr-description	X
standard-attr-revisions	X
standard-attr-tag	X
standard-attr-timestamp	X
subnet_allocation	X
subnet-service-types	X
subnetpool-prefix-ops	
tag-ext	
tag-ports-during-bulk-creation	
trunk	X
trunk-details	X
uplink-status-propagation	

Table	5.10 –	continued	from	previo	ous	page

Table 5.11:	Neutron	Type Drivers
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Neutron Type Drivers	Mandatory
geneve	
gre	
vlan	X
vxlan	

Networking Service APIs: https://docs.openstack.org/api-ref/network/

The exhaustive list of extensions is available at https://docs.openstack.org/api-ref/network/v2/

Nova

Table 5.12: Nova			
OpenStack Service API Version Maximal API Microversion			
Compute: Nova	v2.1	2.88	

Nova Features	Mandatory
attach_encrypted_volume	
cert	
change_password	
cold_migration	X
console_output	X
disk_config	X
instance_password	X
interface_attach	X
live_migration	X
metadata_service	X
pause	X
personality	
rdp_console	
rescue	Х
resize	X
serial_console	
shelve	X
shelve_migrate	
snapshot	X
stable_rescue	
spice_console	
suspend	X
swap_volume	
vnc_console	
volume_multiattach	
xenapi_apis	

Table 5.13: Nova Features

Compute API: https://docs.openstack.org/api-ref/compute/

REST API Version History: https://docs.openstack.org/nova/latest/reference/api-microversion-history.html

Placement

OpenStack Service	API Version	Maximal API Microversion
Placement	v1	1.36

Placement API: https://docs.openstack.org/api-ref/placement/

REST API Version History: https://docs.openstack.org/placement/latest/placement-api-microversion-history.html

Table 5.15: Heat		
OpenStack Service	API Version	Maximal Template Version
Orchestration: Heat	v1	2021-04-16

Orchestration Service API: https://docs.openstack.org/api-ref/orchestration/

Template version history: https://docs.openstack.org/heat/latest/template_guide/hot_spec.html

Heat Orchestration Template (HOT) specification: https://docs.openstack.org/heat/latest/template_guide/hot_spec. html#rocky

5.3 Consolidated Set of APIs

OpenStack Interfaces

This section illustrates some of the Interfaces provided by OpenStack; the exhaustive list of APIs is available at https://docs.openstack.org/api-ref/.

OpenStack REST APIs are simple to interact with using either of two options. Clients can either call the APIs directly using the HTTP or REST library, or they can use one of the many cloud specific programming language libraries.

APIs

Table 5.10. Af is			
OpenStack Ser-	Link for API list	API Version	Maximal API
vice			Microversion
Identity: Keystone	https://docs.openstack.org/api-ref/identity/v3/	v3	3.14
Compute: Nova	https://docs.openstack.org/api-ref/compute/	v2.1	2.88
Networking: Neu-	https://docs.openstack.org/api-ref/network/v2/	v2.0	
tron			
Image: Glance	https://docs.openstack.org/api-ref/image/v2/	v2	2.9
Block Storage: Cin-	https://docs.openstack.org/api-ref/block-storage/v3/	v3	3.64
der			
Placement	https://docs.openstack.org/api-ref/placement/	v1	1.36
Orchestration: Heat	https://docs.openstack.org/api-ref/orchestration/v1/	v1	2021-04-06
			(template)

Table 5.16: APIs

Kubernetes Interfaces

The Kubernetes APIs are available at https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/overview/kubernetes-api/.

Heat

KVM Interfaces

The KVM APIs are documented in Section 4 of the document https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/virtual/ kvm/api.txt.

Libvirt Interfaces

The Libvirt APIs are documented in https://libvirt.org/html/index.html.

Barbican

Table 5.17: Barbican	
OpenStack Service	API Version
Key Manager: Barbican	v1

Barbican API Documentation: https://docs.openstack.org/barbican/latest/api/

6 Security

6.1 Introduction

This guide is intended to provide basic security requirements to architects who are implementing Cloud Infrastructure using OpenStack technology. This is a minimal set of high-level general security practices, not intended to cover all implementation scenarios. Please ensure to also reference your enterprise security and compliance requirements in addition to this guide.

6.2 Security Requirements

Chapter 2 (Cloud Infrastructure Security Requirements and Security Recommendations) gathers all requirements and recommendations regarding security topics developed in this chapter.

6.3 Cloud Infrastructure and VIM Security

In the "Security boundaries and threats" section of the OpenStack security guide, there is extensive description on security domains, threat classifications, and attack vectors. The following only touches on some of the topics and at a high level.

System Hardening

All infrastructure components should undergo system hardening, establish processes to govern the hardening, and documents to cover at a minimal for the following areas.

Server boot hardening

Server boot process must be trusted. For this purpose, the integrity and authenticity of all BIOS firmware components must be verified at boot. Per sec.gen.003 requirement, Secure Boot based on UEFI must be used. By verifying the signatures of all BIOS components, Secure Boot will ensure that servers start with the firmware expected and without malware insertion into the system. Secure Boot checks the digital signatures locally. To implement a chain of trust, Secure Boot must be complemented by the use of a hardware based Root of Trust provided by a TPM (Trusted Platform Module).

System Access

Access to all the platform's components must be restricted (sec.gen.013) applying the following rules:

- Remove, or at a minimal, disable all unnecessary user accounts
- Change all default user accounts where technically feasible
- Change all default credentials
- Prohibit logging with root account when root privileges are not required (sec.gen.006)
- Restrict access according to only those protocols/service/address adhering to the Principle of Least Privilege
- The same authentication credentials must not be reused on different components (sec.sys.011)
- Restrict access to Operating System (sec.gen.005)

Password policy

For all infrastructure components, passwords must be hardened, and a strict password policy must be applied (sec.gen.002).

Passwords must be strengthened:

- All vendors default passwords must be changed
- Passwords must contain at least 8 characters as a minimal value, 14 characters length passwords are recommended
- · Passwords must contain at least one upper case letter, one lower case letter and one non-alphabetic character
- For administration privileges accounts, passwords must contain at least one upper case letter, one lower case letter, one numeral and one special (non-alphanumeric) character

For passwords updates, the identity of users must be verified before permitting a password change.

Passwords must be encrypted at rest and in-transit. Password files must be stored separately from application system data.

Password's composition, complexity and policy should follow the recommendations consolidated within the CIS Password Policy guide such as:

- Check the password for known bad passwords (repetitive or sequential characters, dictionary words, context-specific words, previously used passwords, etc.)
- · Limit number of failed login attempts
- Implement Multi-factor Authentication
- Periodic (for example, Yearly, Quarterly, etc.) password change or on key events such as indication of compromise, change of user roles, a defined period of inactivity, when a user leaves the organisation, etc.

Function and Software

Infrastructure must be implemented to perform the minimal functions needed to operate the Cloud Infrastructure.

Regarding software (sec.gen.004):

- Install only software which is required to support the functions
- · Remove any unnecessary software or packages
- Where software cannot be removed, disable all services to it

Patches

All deployed Cloud Infrastructure software must be audited and must be implemented to allow installation of the latest patches to address security vulnerabilities in the following timescale from discovery (sec.gen.008, sec.lcm.011):

Severity	Time to Remediate
Zero-Day	Immediately or as soon as practically possible
Critical	30 days
High	60 days
Medium	90 days
Low	180 days

See Common Vulnerability Scoring System and NIST Vulnerability Metrics.

Network Protocols

- Only allow protocols that are required by the system functions (sec.sys.002)
- Tighten all required TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol) services

Anti-Virus and Firewall

- Install and run your Enterprise approved anti-virus software/ intrusion protection/ malware/ spyware endpoint security software with up-to-date profiles; minimal daily refresh
- Install and run firewall software where applicable

Vulnerability Detection and Prevention

- Implement DoS (Denial of Service) protection where applicable
- Ensure logging and alerting is actively running
- Run host-based scanning and fix all findings per vulnerability severity
- Run network-based scanning and fix all findings per vulnerability severity

Platform Access

Identity Security

The OpenStack Identity service (Keystone) provides identity, token, catalog, and policy services for use specifically by services in the OpenStack family. Identity service is organised as a group of internal services exposed on one or many endpoints. Many of these services are used in a combined fashion by the front end (sec.sys.006).

OpenStack Keystone can work with an Identity service that your enterprise may already have, such as LDAP with Active Directory. In those cases, the recommendation is to integrate Keystone with the cloud provider's Identity Services.

Authentication

Authentication is the first line of defence for any real-world implementation of OpenStack. At its core, authentication is the process of confirming the user logging in is who they claim to be. OpenStack Keystone supports multiple methods of authentication, such as username/password, LDAP, and others. For more details, please refer to OpenStack Authentication Methods.

Limiting the number of repeated failed login attempts (configurable) reduces the risk of unauthorised access via password guessing (Bruce force attack) - sec.mon.006. The restriction on the number of consecutive failed login attempts ("lockout_failure_attempts") and any actions post such access attempts (such as locking the account where the "lockout_duration" is left unspecified) should abide by the operator's policies. For example, an operator may restrict the number of consecutive failed login attempts to 3 ("lockout_failure_attempts = 3") and lock the account preventing any further access and where the account is unlocked by getting necessary approvals.

Keystone Tokens

Once a user is authenticated, a token is generated for authorisation and access to an OpenStack environment and resources. By default, the token is set to expire in one hour. This setting can be changed based on the business and operational needs, but it's highly recommended to set the expiration to the shortest possible value without dramatically impacting your operations.

Special Note on Logging Tokens: since the token would allow access to the OpenStack services, it *MUST* be masked before outputting to any logs.

Authorisation

Authorisation serves as the next level of defence. At its core, it checks if the authenticated users have the permission to execute an action. Most Identity Services support the notion of groups and roles. A user belongs to groups and each group has a list of roles that permits certain actions on certain resources. OpenStack services reference the roles of the user attempting to access the service. OpenStack policy enforcer middleware takes into consideration the policy rules associated with each resource and the user's group/roles and association to determine if access will be permitted for the requested resource. For more details on policies, please refer to the OpenStack Policies.

RBAC

In order to properly manage user access to OpenStack services, service providers must utilise the Role Based Access Control (RBAC) system (sec.sys.001, sec.sys.007). Based on the OpenStack Identify Service (Keystone v3) Group and Domain component, the RBAC system implements a set of access roles that accommodate most use cases. Operations staff can create users and assign them to roles using standard OpenStack commands for users, groups, and roles.

Keystone provides three default roles: admin, member, and reader. As of Train release, Keystone applies the following personas consistently across its API.

- The reader role provides read-only access to resources within the system, a domain, or a project.
- The member role is the same as reader in Keystone, but allows to introduce granularity between admin and reader to other OpenStack services.
- The admin role is reserved for the most privileged operations within a given scope for managing resources.

For specific use-case, policies can be overridden, and new roles can be created for each OpenStack service by editing the policy.json file.

Rules

The following rules govern create, read, update, and delete (CRUD) level access.

- member can create, read, update, and delete the resources defined at the tenant level.
- support_member can create and read the resources defined at the tenant level.
- viewer can read the resources defined at the tenant level.
- admin can create, read, update, and delete all resources.

Recommended Default Roles to Start

site_admin (HIGHLY RESTRICTED)

- Site Level Super Admin usually assign to Operation Staffs who already have root level access to hosts
- Permission to create/read/update/delete all tenants and resources at the site, including creating snapshot and upload public images
- Limited ability to create/read/update/delete tenant projects

site_admin_support

- Site Level Admin usually assign to Operation Staffs who need to manage resource except delete
- · Permission to create/read/update all tenants and resources at the site
- Cannot create snapshots

site_admin_viewer

- Site Level Admin Read Only usually assign to groups who need to view all resources, such as Capacity Planners
- · Permission to read all tenants and resources at the site
- Cannot create/update/delete

site_image_manager

• Site wide admin level privileges to Glance API (via CLI)

• Restricted to Image team

tenant_member

- Tenant Level Admin typically assign to majority of tenant users to manage their resources
- · Permission to create/read/update/delete to all resources at the tenant project level
- · Cannot upload image or create snapshot
- Cannot touch any other tenant except the one the role is located

tenant_snapshot_member

- *Tenant Level Admin with Snapshot* typically assign to tenant users who need to create snapshot via special request to Operations Staff
- Permission is same as tenant_member except the user can also create snapshots

tenant_support_member

- Tenant Level Support typically assign to tenant users who need to create resource in the project space
- Permission to create/read all resources at the tenant project level
- Cannot update/delete or create snapshots

tenant_viewer

- Tenant Level Read Only typically assign to tenant users who need to read all resources in the project space
- Permission to read all resources at the tenant level
- Cannot create/update/delete

Confidentiality and Integrity

Confidentiality implies that data and resources must be protected against unauthorised introspection/exfiltration. Integrity implies that the data must be protected from unauthorised modifications or deletions.

Regarding confidentiality and integrity in Cloud Infrastructure, 2 main concerns are raised:

- confidentiality and integrity of the Cloud Infrastructure components (networks, hypervisor, OpenStack services)
- confidentiality and integrity of the tenant's data

The Cloud Infrastructure must also provide the mechanism to identify corrupted data.

Confidentiality and Integrity of communications (sec.ci.001)

It is essential to secure the infrastructure from external attacks. To counter this threat, API endpoints exposed to external networks must be protected by either a rate-limiting proxy or web application firewall (WAF), and must be placed behind a reverse HTTPS proxy (sec.mon.008). Attacks can also be generated by corrupted internal components, and for this reason, it is security best practice to ensure integrity and confidentiality of all network communications (internal and external) by using Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol (sec.sys.003, sec.sys.004). When using TLS, according to the OpenStack security guide recommendation, the minimum version to be used is TLS 1.2.

3 categories of traffic will be protected using TLS:

- traffic from and to external domains
- communications between OpenStack components (OpenStack services, Bus message, Data Base)
- management traffic

Certificates used for TLS encryption must be compliant with X.509 standards and be signed by a trusted authority (sec.sys.017). To issue certificates for internal OpenStack users or services, the cloud provider can use a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) with its own internal Certification Authority (CA), certificate policies, and management.

Integrity of OpenStack components configuration

The cloud deployment components/tools store all the information required to install the infrastructure including sensitive information such as credentials. It is recommended to turn off deployment components after deployment to minimise the attack surface area, limit the risk of compromise, and to deploy and provision the infrastructure through a dedicated network (VLAN).

Configuration files contain sensitive information. These files must be protected from malicious or accidental modifications or deletions by configuring strict access permissions for such files. All access, failed attempts to change and all changes (pre-change, post-change and by who) must be securely logged, and all failed access and failed changes must be alerted on (sec.mon.005).

The Cloud Infrastructure must provide the mechanisms to identify corrupted data (sec.gen.009):

- the integrity of configuration files and binaries must be checked by using cryptographic hash
- it is recommended to run scripts (such as checksec.sh) to verify the properties of the QEMU/KVM
- it is recommended to use tools such as CIS-CAT (Center for Internet security- Configuration Assessment Tool) to check the compliance of systems configuration against respective CIS benchmarks.

It is strongly recommend to protect all repositories, such as Linux repositories and Docker registries, against the corruption of their data and unauthorised access, by adopting protection measures such as hosting a local repository/registry with restricted and controlled access, and using TLS (sec.img.004, sec.img.005, sec.img.006). This repository/registry must contain only signed images or packages.

Confidentiality and Integrity of tenant data (sec.ci.001)

Tenant data are forwarded unencrypted over the network. Since the VNF is responsible for its security, it is up to the VMs to establish secure data plane, e.g., using IPsec over its tenant network.

A Cloud actor must not be able to retrieve secrets used by VNF managers. All communications between the VNFM or orchestrator, and the infrastructure must be protected in integrity and confidentiality (e.g., by using TLS) and controlled via appropriate IP filtering rules (sec.lcm.006).

The Cloud Infrastructure must onboard only trusted and verified VM images, implying that VNF vendors provide signed images (sec.img.001); images from non-trusted sources may contain security breaches or unsolicited malicious code (spoofing, information disclosure). It is recommended to scan all VM images with a vulnerability scanner(sec.img.002). The scan is mandatory for images from unknown or untrusted sources.

To mitigate tampering attacks, it is recommended to use the Glance image signing feature to validate an image when uploading. In this case, Barbican service must be installed.

In order to protect data, VNFs must encrypt the volumes they use. In this case, the encryption key must not be stored on the infrastructure. When a key management service is provided by the infrastructure, OpenStack can encrypt data on behalf of tenants (sec.gen.010). It is recommended to rely on Barbican, as the key manager service of OpenStack.

Workload Security

OpenStack segregates its infrastructure (sec.ci.008) (for example, hosts) by Regions, Host Aggregates and Availability Zones (AZ). Workloads can also be segregated by server groups (affinity and non-affinity groups) (sec.sys.008). These options support the workloads placement requirement (sec.wl.001, sec.wl.004).

Separation of non-production and production workloads, or by workload category (for example, payment card information, healthcare, etc.) requires separation through server groups (for example, Regions, AZs), but also requires network and storage segregation as in Regions. Thus, the separation of these workloads is handled through placement of workloads in separate AZs and/or Regions (sec.wl.005 and sec.wl.006).

Regions also support the sec.wl.004 requirement for separation by Location (for example, country).

Operational security is handled through a combination of mechanisms including the above and security groups (sec.sys.002). Security groups limit the types of traffic that have access to instances. One or more security groups can be automatically assigned to an instance at launch. The rules associated with a security group control the incoming traffic. Any incoming traffic not matched by a rule is denied access. The security group rules govern access through the setting of different parameters: traffic source, protocols and destination port on a VM. Errors in provisioning/managing OpenStack Security Groups can lead to non-functioning applications, and it can take a long time to identify faults and correct them. Thus, the use of tools for auto provisioning and continued inspection of security groups and network policies is required.

Given the rate of change in the workload development and deployment, and the cloud environment itself, sec.wl.003 requires that the workloads must be assessed during the CI/CD process as the images are created and then whenever they are deployed. In addition, the infrastructure must be configured for security as discussed elsewhere in this chapter including secure boot.

SR-IOV and DPDK Considerations

The SR-IOV agent only works with NoopFirewallDriver when Security Groups are enabled, but can still use other firewall_driver for other Agents by updating their conf with the requested firewall driver. Please see SR-IOV Passthrough for Networking.

Operators typically do not implement Security Groups when using SR-IOV or DPDK networking technologies.

Image Security

Images from untrusted sources must not be used (sec.img.001). Valuable guidance on trusted image creation process and image signature verification is provided in the "Trusted Images" section of the OpenStack Security Guide. The OpenStack Security Guide includes reference to the "OpenStack Virtual Machine Image Guide" that describes how to obtain, create, and modify OpenStack compatible virtual machine images.

Images to be ingested, including signed images from trusted sources, need to be verified prior to ingestion into the Image Service (Glance) (sec.gen.009). The operator will need toolsets for scanning images, including for virus and malware detection (sec.img.002). Adding Signed Images to the Image Service (Glance) is specified in OpenStack Operations Guide. Image signing and verification protects image integrity and authenticity by enabling deployers to sign images and save the signatures and public key certificates as image properties. The creation of signature per individual artifact in the VNF package is required by ETSI NFV SOL004.

The chain of trust requires that all images are verified again in the Compute service (Nova) prior to use. Integrity verification at the time of instantiation is required by ETSI NFV SEC021.

Images must be also updated to benefit from the latest security patches (sec.gen.008, sec.img.007).

Security LCM

Cloud Infrastructure LCM encompasses provisioning, deployment, configuration and management (resources scaling, services upgrades, etc.) as described in Operations and Life Cycle Management. These operations must be securely performed in order to keep the infrastructure safe and operational (sec.lcm.003).

Provisioning/Deployment

Regarding the provisioning of servers, switches, routers and networking, tools must be used to automate the provisioning eliminating human error. For Infrastructure hardware resources, a set of recommendations is detailed in Underlying resources provisioning to automate and secure their provisioning (sec.lcm.001).

For OpenStack services and software components, deployment tools or components must be used to automate the deployment and avoid errors. The deployment tool is a sensitive component storing critical information (deployment scripts, credentials, etc.). The following rules must be applied:

- The boot of the server or the VM hosting the deployment tool must be protected
- Integrity of the deployment images must be checked, before starting deployment
- Deployment must be done through dedicated network (e.g. VLAN)
- When the deployment is finished, the deployment tool must be turned-off, if the tool is only dedicated to deployment. Otherwise, any access to the deployment tool must be restricted.
- Strict access permissions must be set on OpenStack configuration files.

Configuration and management

Configuration operations must be tracked (sec.gen.015, sec.mon.006, sec.mon.007). Events such as system access attempts, actions with high privileges, modification of configuration, must be logged and exported on the fly to a non-local storage. The communication channel used for log collection must be protected for integrity and confidentiality, and the logs protected against unauthorised modification (sec.mon.004).

Per sec.sys.0016 and sec.lcm.002 requirements, management protocols limiting security risks must be used such as SNMPv3, SSH v2, ICMP, NTP, syslog and TLS. How to secure logging is described in the following section.

Platform backup

The storage for backup must be independent of storage offered to tenants.

Security upgrades

To defend against virus or other attacks, security patches must be installed for firmware, OS, Hypervisor and OpenStack services according to their criticality.

Monitoring and Security Audit

The intent of this section is to provide a key baseline and minimum requirements to implement logging that can meet the basic monitoring and security auditing needs. This should provide sufficient preliminary guidance, but is not intended to provide a comprehensive solution. Regular review of security logs that record user access, as well as session (sec.mon.010) and network activity (sec.mon.012), is critical in preventing and detecting intrusions that could disrupt business operations. This monitoring process also allows administrators to retrace an intruder's activity and may help correct any damage caused by the intrusion (sec.mon.011).

The logs have to be continuously monitored and analysed with alerts created for anomalies (sec.lcm.005). The resources for logging, monitoring and alerting also need to be logged and monitored, and corrective actions taken so that they are never short of the needed resources (sec.mon.015).

Creating Logs

- All resources to which access is controlled, including but not limited to applications and operating systems, must have the capability of generating security audit logs (sec.mon.001).
- Logs must be generated for all components (e.g., Nova in OpenStack) that form the Cloud Infrastructure (sec.mon.001).
- All security logging mechanisms must be active from system initialisation (sec.mon.018):
 - These mechanisms include any automatic routines necessary to maintain the activity records and clean-up
 programs to ensure the integrity of the security audit/logging systems.
- Logs must be time synchronised (sec.mon.002).

What to Log / What NOT to Log

What to log

Where technically feasible the following system events must be recorded (sec.mon.005):

- Successful and unsuccessful login attempts including:
 - Command line authentication (i.e., when initially getting token from keystone)
 - Horizon authentication
 - SSH authentication and sudo on the computes, controllers, network and storage nodes
- Logoffs
- Successful and unsuccessful changes to a privilege level (sec.lcm.012)
- · Successful and unsuccessful configuration changes
- · Successful and unsuccessful security policy changes
- Starting and stopping of security logging
- Creating, removing, or changing the inherent privilege level of users (sec.lcm.012)
- Connections to a network listener of the resource
- · Starting and stopping of processes including attempts to start unauthorised processes
- All command line activity performed by the following innate OS programs known to otherwise leave no evidence upon command completion including PowerShell on Windows systems (e.g., Servers, Desktops, and Laptops)
- Where technically feasible, any other security events should be recorded

What NOT to log

Security audit logs must NOT contain:

- Authentication credentials, even if encrypted (e.g., password) (sec.mon.019);
- Keystone Token;
- Proprietary or Sensitive Personal Information.

Where to Log

- The logs must be stored in an external system (sec.mon.018), in a manner where the event can be linked to the resource on which it occurred.
- Where technically feasible, events must be recorded on the device (e.g. VM, physical node, etc.) where the event occurs, if the external logging system is not available (sec.mon.021).
- Security audit logs must be protected in transit and at rest (sec.mon.004).

Required Fields

The security audit log must contain at minimum the following fields (sec.mon.001) where applicable and technically feasible:

- Event type
- Date/time
- Protocol
- Service or program used for access
- Success/failure
- Login ID Where the Login ID is defined on the system/application/authentication server; otherwise, the field should contain 'unknown', in order to protect authentication credentials accidentally entered at the Login ID prompt from appearing in the security audit log.
- Source and destination IP Addresses and ports

Data Retention

- Log files must be retained for 180 days, or the relevant regulator mandate, or your customer mandate, whichever is higher (sec.mon.020).
- Implementation and monitoring: after 180 days or your mandated retention period, security audit logs must be destroyed.

Security Logs Time Synchronisation

The host and various system clocks must be synchronised with an authenticated time service/NTP server (sec.gen.007).

In any time synchronisation, we need to specify the synchronisation interval and the tolerance where the latter specifies the permissible difference the local time can be out of synchronisation. Whenever the time synchronisation forces the local time to change or the use of another NTP server, the change details must be logged including time server source, time, date and time zones (sec.mon.003).

7 Operations and Life Cycle Management

7.1 Introduction

To create an Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud requires the provisioning and deployment of the underlying infrastructure (compute, networking and storage) and deployment, configuration and management of the necessary software on the infrastructure; in the process of deploying the software, configuration of the infrastructure may also need to be performed.

Instead of deploying the infrastructure components and services manually, the current best practice is to write *code* (Infrastructure as Code, IaC) to define, provision, deploy, configure and manage the IaaS cloud infrastructure and services. IaC tools allows the entire provisioning, configuration and management processes to be automated. The desired state of the infrastructure and services is represented in a set of human readable, machine executable, and version-controlled files. With version control, it is easy to roll back to an older version and have access to the history of all committed changes.

The provisioning of the infrastructure is typically performed by provisioning tools while the deployment of the software and the configuration of the software, and where needed the infrastructure, falls in the domain of configuration management tools. A single tool may support both provisioning and configuration management.

Operators may choose certain paradigms with respect to how they provision and configure their IaaS cloud. These paradigms will drive the selection of the provisioning and configuration tools. In this chapter we will discuss the capabilities of provisioning and configuration management systems; some Open Source tools may be mentioned but their capabilities are beyond the scope of this chapter.

Procedural versus Declarative code

The procedural style IaC tools require code that specifies how to achieve the desired state. Whilst the declarative style IaC tools require code that specifies the desired state (what not how). The major difference between the two styles emerges when changes to the desired state are required. In the procedural style, the change is coded in terms of the difference between the desired and current states while in the declarative style the new desired state is specified. In the procedural style since the state difference has to be coded, a new code file has to be created for each change; in the declarative style the existing code file is updated with the new state information. In the declarative style knowledge of the current state is not required. In the procedural style, knowledge of the current state has to be manually figured by tracing the created code files and the order in which they were applied.

Mutable versus Immutable infrastructure

In the mutable infrastructure paradigm, software updates are made in place. Over time this can lead to configuration drift where each server becomes slightly different from all other servers. In the immutable infrastructure paradigm, new servers are deployed with the new software version and then the old servers are undeployed.

7.2 Cloud Infrastructure provisioning and configuration management

In the Reference Model, Configuration and Lifecycle Management defines the functions of Configuration and Life Cycle Management (LCM). To operate and manage a scalable cloud, that minimizes operational costs, requires tools that incorporates systems for automated provisioning and deployment, and managing configurations that ensures the correctness and integrity of the deployed and configured systems.

Underlying resources provisioning

This section deals with automated provisioning of the Cloud Infrastructure; for example, provisioning the servers, switches, routers, networking (e.g., subnets, routing tables, load balancers, etc.), databases and all required operating systems (Servers, switches, etc.).

The following are the minimum tasks that need to be performed by automation:

- **Pre-boot configuration** such as BIOS/RAID/IPMI settings: Hardware manufacturers typically have their proprietary interface for these tasks but standards such as Redfish are being increasingly utilised. Consider using tooling to ensure consistency across all infrastructure components.
- **Bootloader installation** of base Network Operating System (NOS) on networking equipment or the Operating System (OS) should be performed using PXE; again consider tooling to ensure consistency across all infrastructure components.

To ensure operational efficiency and save cost and time, the lifecycle management for physical and virtual servers must be automated using tools which will handle the repetitive tasks like provisioning, configuration, and monitoring. Foreman is commonly used to automate the provisoning and management of bare metal infrastructure. Foreman is an open-source project, base of several commercial products. Foreman provides the full management of PXE configuration and the installation for many Operating Systems (CentOS, Fedora, Ubuntu, Debian, Red Hat Entreprise Linux, OpenSUSE, etc.). Foreman service can be installed by Ansible https://docs.ansible.com/ playbooks. Ansible playbooks are basic tools for the automation of the infrastructure virtualization layer deployments.

VIM deployment

When the underlying resources are installed and configured, the VIM software is deployed. An automated deployment is highly recommended for the same reasons of efficiency. Open-source installers are available to perform the deployments of the OpenStack services. A subset of these tools is described below.

• OpenStack TripleO, "OpenStack on OpenStack"

TripleO is an official OpenStack project which allows to deploy and manage a production cloud onto bare metal hardware using a subset of existing OpenStack components. The first step of deployment is the creation of an "undercloud" or deployment cloud. The undercloud contains the necessary OpenStack components to deploy and manage an "overcloud", representing the deployed cloud. The architecture document describes the solution. Nova and Ironic are used in the undercloud to manage the servers in bare metal environment. TripleO leverages on Heat tempates.

• Airship v2

Airship is supported by the OpenStack Foundation. It is a collection of interopable open-source components allowing to declaratively automate cloud provisioning. The configurations are defined by YAML documents. All services are running on containers. Airship v2 is aligned with maturing CNCF projects such as Kubernetes, Kubectl, Kubeadmin, Argo, Cluster API, Kustomize, and Metal3. Airship v2.1, released in November 2021, leverages on Kubernetes 1.21. It includes cloud provisioning at edge and for 3rd party cloud. The use of the OpenStack-Helm project allows the deployment of OpenStack on top of Kubernetes. Airship is not only a provisioning tool, but also a also a configuration management system.

• StarlingX

StarlingX is dedicated to cloud infrastructure deployment at the edge, taking into account the specific edge use cases requirements for low latency and precision clock synchronisation. It aims to install a containerised version of OpenStack services, leveraging on Kubernetes, Docker registry, Airship Armada, and Helm.

OpenStack-Helm is used as a starting point. OpenStack is installed and managed as an Armada application. Armada Applications are a set of one or more interdependent Application Helm charts. In the case of StarlingX, there is generally a Helm chart for every OpenStack service.

Configuration Management

The configuration management system ensures the correctness and integrity of the deployed and configured systems. The tools provide the assurance that the expected software is running with the expected configurations on correctly configured nodes that continue to be configured correctly.

Configuration Management is composed of the following activities:

- Desired (Target) State: a version of the software and hardware and their configurations. Depending upon the configuration management system these configurations are specified in cookbooks, playbooks, manifests, etc. The configuration specifications in these artefacts is used to configure the different types of nodes, BIOS, operating systems, hypervisor and OpenStack services (through settings within their config files such as nova.conf, etc.).
- Current State: the current configuration of software and hardware as provided by monitoring systems
- State variance mitigation: The CM system, on discovering a variance between the desired and current states, acts to drive the state to the desired state. Each CM system accomplishes the task in different ways.

7.3 Cloud Infrastructure and VIM Maintenance

Cloud Infrastructure and VIM Maintenance activities can be classified as

- 1. Deployment of additional infrastructure components (or removal of infrastructure components)
- 2. Cloud Infrastructure Configuration changes
- 3. VIM Configuration changes
- 4. Version changes (upgrade) of Cloud Infrastructure software (for example, Host Operating System, Hypervisor, etc.)
- 5. Version changes of VIM Software (or component services)

Deployment (or removal) of infrastructure components

In declarative tools, the code with the specified desired state (for example, number of compute servers) is modified to the new desired state. The IaC tool then ensures that the desired state is achieved. In procedural tools, the step-by-step code to deploy (remove) infrastructure components needs to be specified. Existing code can be cloned, and appropriate changes made to get to the desired state.

Configuration and Version Changes

Configuration and Version Changes are made in a similar fashion to the "Deployment of infrastructure components" except that the IaC tools used maybe different.

7.4 Logging, Monitoring and Analytics

- Logging
- Monitoring
- Alerting
- Logging, Monitoring, and Analytics (LMA) Framework

Logging

A log, in the context of computing, is the automatically produced and time-stamped documentation of events relevant to a particular system. All software, including operating systems, middleware and applications produce log files. Enterprises and vendors may have custom monitoring and logging solutions. The intent of the logging and monitoring is to capture events and data of interest to the Cloud Infrastructure and workloads so that appropriate actions can be taken. For example,

- Operating systems and web servers maintain an access log of all access requests, session details and file access.
- Databases maintain a transaction log of all transaction executed including an added, changed and deleted data.
- Audit logs record chronological documentation of any activities that could have affected a particular operation or event. Data typically includes resources accessed, destination and source addresses, and a timestamp and login information for the person who accessed the resources.

Some of the data is to support the metrics collection specified in the Infrastructure Capabilities, Measurements and Catalogue.

Logs have multiple operational uses including for:

- 1. Regulatory Compliance and Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) featuring the automated gathering, analysis and correlation of log data across all systems and devices across an operator to provide real-time analysis, event prioritization, reporting, notification and alerting.
- 2. Monitoring across systems in real-time to detect particular log events, patterns, anomalies or inactivity to gauge system and application health
- 3. Identify system and application performance and configuration issues
- 4. Root cause analysis for system and application failures and errors
- 5. Ensuring that operational objectives and SLAs are met

Monitoring

Monitoring is the process of collecting, aggregating, and analysing values that improve awareness of the components' characteristics and behavior. The data from various parts of the environment are collected into a monitoring system that is responsible for storage, aggregation, visualisation, and initiating automated responses when the values meet specific threshold.

Monitoring systems fulfill many related functions. Their first responsibility is to accept and store incoming and historical data. While values representing the current point in time are useful, it is almost always more helpful to view those numbers in relation to past values to provide context around changes and trends.

Alerting

Alerting is the responsive component of a monitoring system that performs actions based on changes in metric values. Alert definitions are composed of two components: a metrics-based condition or threshold, and an action to perform when the values fall outside of the acceptable conditions.

While monitoring systems are incredibly useful for active interpretation and investigation, one of the primary benefits of a complete monitoring system is letting administrators disengage from the system. Alerts allow the specification of situations that make sense to actively manage, while relying on the passive monitoring of the software to watch for changing conditions.

Logging, Monitoring, and Analytics (LMA) Framework

In this section, a possible framework utilising Prometheus, Fluentd, Elasticsearch and Kibana is given as an example only.




Figure 7-1: Monitoring and Logging Framework

The monitoring and logging framework (**Figure 7-1**) leverages Prometheus as the monitoring engine and Fluentd for logging. In addition, the framework uses Elasticsearch to store and organise logs for easy access. Prometheus agents pull information from individual components on every host. Fluentd, an Open Source data collector, unifies data collection and consumption for better use and understanding of data. Fluentd captures the access, application and system logs.

8 Gaps, Innovation, and Development

8.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to identify the gaps between what is required for automated deployment of VNFs on Cloud Infrastructure frameworks and the framework offered by OpenStack. Once gaps are identified, the next step will be to propose a plan to address these gaps. The most obvious way to address the gaps will be to propose a set of APIs in the upstream OpenStack community

8.2 The Gap

Autoscaling

With regards to resource autoscaling (gen.scl.01 General Recommendations) it is recommended that the NFVO/VNFM manages the policy and triggers a scale-up or scale-down action based on application telemetry, event, AI, or ML etc. While the use of telemetry and alarming system can trigger a scaling operation based on resource utilisation, without application context this may not provide the granularity or reaction time required by the application. It is therefore suggested that an OpenStack scaling operation is called using an appropriate autoscaling web-hook by the NFVO/VNFM.

For more information on auto-scaling with Heat please see: https://docs.openstack.org/senlin/latest/scenarios/ autoscaling_heat.html. Please note that the OpenStack Senlin service is still under development with major architectural changes made in the OpenStack Ussuri release.

Please note: physical compute node autoscaling is out of scope.